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Foreword
This is the final of the four case studies that form part of The North-South Institute’s project on
Poverty and Policy Coherence. The first study on Mali was released in November 2000, the second
on Bangladesh in November 2001, and the third on Jamaica in March 2002. The initial idea for the
project grew out of the Institute’s reflections at the time of Canada’s Foreign Policy Review in 1994,
when we noted:
“It is critical to ensure greater coherence between all of Canada’s relations with developing countries.
Too often, policies in one area fail to take into account the possible implications for our development
efforts (or vice versa), whether as a result of inadequate time, interdepartmental competition, or
ignorance. At best this can mean that possible synergies are wasted. At worst fragile development
efforts are undermined.” 
With funding from the Canadian International Development Agency and the International
Development Agency, we decided to undertake a series of three developing country case studies to
examine how Canadian aid and non-aid policies interact in practice. These studies also consider how
Canadian policies interact with the poverty reduction policies of the recipient country and other
donor agencies operating in that country. This Canadian case study focuses on the growing interna-
tional engagements of different government departments and the need for closer collaboration, espe-
cially if Canada is to maximize its support of global poverty reduction efforts. The recently launched
dialogue on foreign policy provides an important opportunity to consider the critical issues of






We would like to thank both the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) for their financial support of this project.
Special thanks are also due to the many people in Ottawa and in the three case-study countries for
sharing their time and thoughts on policy coherence with us. The views contained in this report,
however, are the responsibility of the authors alone, and not those of The North-South Institute,
CIDA, IDRC, nor any of those people whom we interviewed. We would also like to thank those
involved in the research and writing at an earlier stage: Leanne Burton of IDRC and Kerry Max of
CIDA. Finally, thanks are due to Institute staff Diane Pichette for her help in organizing our
research team and advisory committee meetings and to Dina Shadid for providing us with many doc-
umentary sources.
Ann Weston and Daniel Pierre-Antoine
About the Authors
Ann Weston is Vice President and Research Coordinator of The North-South Institute. Besides her
work on Policy Coherence, her current research focuses on the international trade regime, notably
the World Trade Organization, and its implications for developing countries. Her previous research
addressed the consequences of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), resulting in a
number of publications, notably The NAFTA Papers: Implications for Canada, Mexico and Developing
Countries, and Jamaica After NAFTA: Trade Options and Sectoral Strategies. She co-authored Women
and The New Trade Agenda, published by UNIFEM. 
Before joining the Institute, Weston worked as Senior Economics Officer in the Economic Affairs
Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat, and as Research Officer at the Overseas Development
Institute (ODI) in London. Weston received her degrees in economics at the Universities of Sussex
and London. She is currently Secretary-Treasurer for the Canadian Association for the Study of
International Development (CASID).
Daniel-Pierre Antoine is a graduate of l’Université de Montréal and a PhD candidate in the
Department of Political Science at Carleton University. His dissertation attempts to reconcile
diverse perspectives on world politics with a view to achieving a more inclusive practice of global




Since this research project began, policy coherence has become a common phrase, widely used in
policy documents, speeches, and declarations, within Canada and internationally, by officials and
NGOs concerned about the reduction of poverty in developing countries. 
At a conceptual level, there is a general understanding of the problems that can arise (from lack of
credibility to wasted resources) if different departments in the same government pursue conflicting
policies. In the field of international development, where resources are scarce, a longstanding issue
has been how to improve the coordination and complementarity of donor aid policies and programs
not only with each other but also with the policies and programs of recipient countries. In recent
years a third dimension has come into play, namely coherence with donor non-aid policies. 
Canadian foreign policy interests — notably economic and security — can be affected by whether or
not development policies are successful in tackling poverty, stimulating growth and enhancing politi-
cal stability. Similarly, Canadian actions whether directly (e.g., on developing country debt and
trade), or indirectly (e.g., on the governance of global finance and trade) can influence the outcome
of development efforts. There are also other policy areas, traditionally considered to be more
domestic, such as health and the environment, where it is clear that successes and failures in devel-
oping country governance will have positive and negative spillovers in Canada. Canadian national
objectives in these areas often cannot be met without parallel progress in developing countries.
Efforts to eradicate TB and reverse global warming are just two examples. Canadian national initia-
tives, for example, on health, may strengthen or weaken developing country efforts (as illustrated by
the debate over drug patents).1
This convergence of interests internationally was underlined by the UNDP’s work on global public
goods, that is, goods which have benefits that spread across countries and generations, such as finan-
cial stability and environmental sustainability.2 Increasing openness of national economies, and the
increasing number of globally systemic risks are some reasons underlying the urgency of national
policies which take into account their externalities, that is their implications for the rest of the world.
As the report notes, “international cooperation must form an integral part of national public policy
making. Clearly, the dividing line between internal and external affairs has become blurred, requir-
ing a new approach.”3 The UNDP recommends that donors internalize the costs and benefits of
externalities; create national externality profiles; track national and external expenditures at least by
government departments in key areas, such as finance, trade, health and the environment;4 and dif-
ferentiate and track aid which contributes to global public goods from aid with more limited effects
(i.e., primarily within recipient countries).
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While global action can be difficult, as the UNDP notes, there has been increasing international
attention given to promoting policy coherence, particularly in the discussions about trade, finance,
and development. At the end of the Uruguay Round it was agreed that “with a view to achieving
greater coherence in global economic policy-making, the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with
the IMF and with the IBRD and its affiliated agencies.”5 At Doha in November 2001, WTO mem-
bers went further, by deciding to create a working group on trade, debt, and finance, to consider
steps which the WTO might take that would contribute to resolving developing countries’ debt
problems, and how to protect the trading system from the effects of financial and monetary instabil-
ity.6 At Monterrey, in March 2002, the consensus document underlined the need for the UN, the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the WTO to address issues of coherence,
coordination and cooperation in the international monetary, financial, trading, and development sys-
tems, while recognizing that governments needed “to continue to improve our domestic policy
coherence through the continued engagement of our ministries of development, finance, trade and
foreign affairs, as well as our central banks.”7
The donor community, through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), has played a key role in promoting the con-
cept of policy coherence as well as designing guidelines for use in the review of donor performance.
The DAC’s primary purpose is to ensure that donor policies in a broad range of areas at best
enhance, and at least do not undermine, efforts directed at poverty reduction. The new international
context makes this task necessary. Notes the DAC, “In a world where there is no longer a clear dis-
tinction between domestic and international affairs, effective development co-operation programmes
alone will not adequately reduce poverty. Development objectives need to be integrated throughout
the full range of government departments, not only in developing countries but also in OECD
countries.”8
At a design level, the initial work of the DAC on policy coherence was undertaken by the Informal
Network on Poverty Reduction (PovNet). Building on earlier work assessing donor agencies’ com-
mitment to poverty reduction and their capacity to follow-through,9 this group has produced a series
of documents on policy coherence out of which a checklist and set of guidelines were drawn up for
use in DAC peer reviews. There are seven priority areas:
1. international trade (in goods, service, and technology) and foreign direct investment
2. economic and financial issues (e.g., macroeconomic policies, portfolio investment, interna-
tional financial architecture, debt) 
3. agriculture and food security (including trade, food aid, research and GMOs) 
4. natural resources and the environment (global, regional, local environment issues, use of
renewable and non-renewable resources, trade agreements) 
5. social issues (such as education, health, social safety nets and migration) 
6. governance (including human rights, labour rights, responsive public institutions), and 
7. conflict and security (including conflict prevention and the arms trade).10
In addition, the OECD/DAC has suggested various ways for increasing coherence at all three levels:
within a donor country, in relation to other donors, and with respect to national policies within
recipient countries. Access to information as well as analytical capacity is essential both within gov-
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ernment and outside (NGOs, academia, private sector). There must be a process for bringing this
information and analysis into the policy-making process. Finally, political leadership is critical for
ensuring that traditional, domestic interests do not override development objectives.  
Many governments have moved in this direction. In the UK, the release of two White Papers on the
elimination of world poverty11 committed the UK Government as a whole to a number of actions to
support poverty reduction and the achievement of the International Development Targets. This has
led to various mechanisms for policy coordination including a ministerial-level Inter-Departmental
Working Group on Development. Resources are available in the Department for International
Development (DFID) for identifying trade and investment policies which promote development,
and for discussing these with other departments. In Sweden, a Parliamentary Commission reported
in 2002 on ways to promote policy coherence for global poverty reduction.12 The European Union
(EU) has also begun to reform its development cooperation in order to strengthen coherence
amongst the various bilateral programs of its member states and EU level programs, as well as
between EU development and other policies.13 Other countries, including Finland, Germany, New
Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the US, already have or are developing policies
and procedures for enhancing policy coherence. These range from a Cabinet committee designed
specifically to oversee policy coherence (as in the Netherlands’ Council for European and
International Affairs) to a consultative commission including civil society organizations (CSOs) (in
Switzerland) and a regulation requiring all legislation to be reviewed by the Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development (Germany).14
In Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has made policy coherence a
central pillar in its latest policy statement, Canada Making a Difference in the World: A policy statement
on strengthening aid effectiveness: “The objective of policy coherence, with poverty reduction as a cen-
tral goal, has been accepted and widely supported within the OECD, the G-8, the World Bank, the
IMF and the UN system … CIDA is working to promote policy coherence in the policies adopted
by the Government of Canada … to bring the development perspective to bear on the policy posi-
tion taken by the Canadian government.”15 The details of these new directions, how they might
build on existing efforts to promote coherence in Canadian policies, and whether they will address
some of the shortcomings raised in our country case-study reports, is discussed further below.
Canadian policy coherence efforts were assessed as part of a DAC aid review in mid-2002.
Finally, at the national level in developing countries, there is continuing pressure on governments to
develop coherent sets of policies. While the focus today in many countries has been on the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), other approaches include the World Bank’s Comprehensive
Development Framework, the UN’s Common Country Assessment and Development Assistance
Framework (CCA/DAF), or a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). Donors are encouraged to work
within the same frameworks. 
This new focus on policy coherence has drawn both applause and criticism. For instance, Inter Pares
argues: “Policy coherence is the foundation of the entire project of increased effectiveness and
impact in Canada’s contribution to poverty eradication in the global south. It is a direction that
should be forcefully supported by Canadians.”16
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There are three principal concerns, however. First, will poverty reduction be the goal of policy
coherence? Second, what is the most effective framework for achieving poverty reduction? Third,
will the task of defining, monitoring, and enforcing policy coherence be left to governments and
intergovernmental agencies? 
On the issue of goals, there is some concern that policy coherence will not focus on poverty reduc-
tion, but rather on other national policy objectives (typically commercial or security). This reflects
an underlying doubt about the capacity of donor agencies to identify the impacts of alternative poli-
cies on developing countries, and to quantify the national benefits in following those policies which
are most likely to reduce poverty.17 Even if donor agencies were able to do this, governments may
not be willing to make the tradeoffs. As the OECD has noted, “Policy co-ordination is … a political
as well as an administrative process. Development agencies are often in a weak position politically
compared with most other government departments and public and private interests associated with
areas such as trade, investment, agriculture, and national security.”18
Second, even if poverty reduction is accepted as the goal against which to gauge policy coherence,
will there be any scope for policy debate – or will it be assumed that there is only one way to achieve
that goal (and will that way assume the Bank/Fund macroeconomic policy set)? The suggestion by
Bank/Fund staff that the PRSPs/CDFs are the best framework for achieving policy coherence
around poverty eradication will not reassure the many critics of these approaches.19 But they may
welcome the UN and specifically ECOSOC being brought into the coherence discussion, particu-
larly given its responsibility for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It
has also been suggested that the UN human rights commitments or the MDGs would be an effective
framework for policy coherence — with human rights or the MDGs trumping trade or Bank/Fund
approaches to development. 
If there is no single path to development, as CIDA acknowledges, this will complicate the identifica-
tion of policy coherence/incoherence. For instance, the set of trade policies needed to reduce
poverty in one country may be quite different from what is needed in another. Certainly a key prob-
lem may be that we still do not know enough about the poverty impacts of alternative policies, to be
able to determine at a national level (either in Canada or in developing countries themselves) what
policies are needed to reduce poverty. 
Third, there is a strong argument for making the definition, monitoring, and enforcement of policy
coherence a more inclusive process. Ideally the process should be led by developing countries them-
selves – notably by their governments. Much of the literature refers to the important role that CSOs
can also play, nationally in donor and recipient countries as well as at the multilateral level. CSOs are
adding their voices to the demands for policy coherence and at the same time may be able to help in
the supply of policy coherence by bringing their insights to bear on the impacts that various policies
have on poor people in developing countries.20 Of course many CSOs are quite critical of policy
goals and policy-making procedures, and this has made governments and multilateral organizations
reluctant to discuss policy coherence with them. Nonetheless, there has been some movement in this
direction. In the context of PRSPs, for instance, the World Bank has encouraged governments to
allow civil society participation on the grounds that “participation produces better policy… because
of its potential to build understanding of poverty … (and) clarify trade-offs with other development
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priorities.”21 There is also a role to be played by developing country governments and CSOs in
monitoring the policy coherence of donors and multilateral agencies.
This then is the backdrop for the four case studies which The North-South Institute has undertaken
on policy coherence. 
Key findings and conclusions
The aim of the three developing country case studies — Mali, Bangladesh, and Jamaica — was to
provide country specific illustrations of how Canadian policies interacted with the poverty reduction
policies of both the recipient country and other donor agencies operating in that country (referred to
here as vertical coherence). They also considered how Canadian aid and non-aid policies toward
developing countries have interacted in practice (horizontal coherence). The Ottawa-based study
focused on the key Canadian departments and agencies now active in the international arena and the
extent to which they work together to promote poverty reduction. The points of commonality and
divergence in these areas are considered in turn.  
Vertical coherence
There were some questions in the reports about the extent to which CIDA programming at a coun-
try level adequately reflected the agency’s overall commitment to poverty reduction. While CIDA
had selected six elements as key to poverty reduction, the country programs had focused more nar-
rowly, with economic growth or competitiveness being given a relatively high weighting in Mali and
Jamaica. In Bangladesh, however, the focus was on meeting basic human needs (with a strong
emphasis on improving the status of women) and governance.  
Canada’s influence declined in all three countries with the fall in aid levels during the 1990s. Bilateral
aid in real terms fell by over 60 per cent on average, with the cuts being especially severe in Jamaica.
This has limited the scope for Canada to leverage its development assistance, while its human
resource capacity was also quite limited. More recently, with the regrowth of the aid program, plus
increasing attention to policy capacities and expansion of CIDA’s Policy Branch, there may be
greater scope for talking about policy leverage. 
The reports illustrate the difficulties for donors in finding a balance between leaving the responsibil-
ity for coordinating donor interventions to national governments and assuming it themselves, partic-
ularly when the national strategy does not seem to be effectively addressing the issue of poverty.  In
all three cases, however, there was a recognition that donors must increasingly follow the leadership
of national governments, with scope for ensuring that national policy frameworks are informed as
much as possible by national CSOs. 
Questions were raised about the Bangladesh government’s emphasis on accelerated economic growth
within liberalized markets and whether this would lead to reduced rural poverty, as intended. In this
context, it was suggested that CIDA might have considered supporting different policies or compen-
sating initiatives, for instance to help offset widening income inequalities. The Jamaican govern-
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ment, also faced with new forms of poverty associated with changes in the world economy and the
Jamaican market, had responded with a National Poverty Eradication Program (NPEP). CIDA
sought to make its programming coherent with the NPEP, even though it was not a core funder of
the program. Nonetheless the NSI report considered that the Jamaican government’s efforts to pro-
mote coherence were still too piecemeal, and that a more comprehensive framework would have
helped to set out the core objectives and roles of the various partners. 
Coordination between CIDA and the government in Jamaica appeared to have worked well, with a
single national agency playing the lead role. In contrast, in both Bangladesh and Mali, while relations
overall were reported to be good, coordination was complicated by the number of ministries
involved and competition over resources, as well as concerns about transparency and accountability
in line departments. Decentralization in Mali might make policy coherence more challenging, with
the creation of a new layer of administration creating new needs and new possibilities for donor
agencies. 
Good relations with a recipient government did not mean that CIDA’s policies and programming
priorities were always jointly developed. In other words the commitment in principle to national
ownership was not always evident in practice. The preparation of the Bangladesh Country Program
Framework (CPF) in the late 1990s was quite centralized — primarily limited to CIDA staff in
Ottawa, with little if any consultation on policy directions with NGOs and Canadian executing agen-
cies (CEAs) in Ottawa let alone with partners in the field, whether officials, NGOs or CEAs, despite
the contribution they could make on the basis of their long-term experiences with CIDA projects
and/or field knowledge. This was in contrast to the practices of other donors in Bangladesh (such as
the UK) and even with other CIDA CPF. The process in Mali and in Jamaica was much more inclu-
sive, allowing CIDA to incorporate views from a wide range of groups and thus to ensure greater
coordination of its activities with those of others.  
Aid tying also limited the scope for delegation of responsibility to the partner countries, as well as
leading to other distortions contrary to the objectives of aid effectiveness and supporting private sec-
tor development in beneficiary countries. Canada’s commitments to begin aid untying under the
OECD framework-DAC agreement for LDCs and more significantly in Canada Making a Difference
in the World are critical steps towards greater policy coherence. 
There have been some changes recently, for example, with CIDA meeting CEAs in Ottawa and part-
ners in Bangladesh to discuss operational issues. This could be extended to include policies,
programming, and CIDA’s new directions more generally as they apply to Bangladesh. Discussing
policies in partnership with NGOs and even community-level organizations can insert a degree of
accountability into the process, as these partcipants would be vocal if later they found that the poli-
cies were ineffective and/or resources were being misdirected. 
One of the new directions emerging from CIDA’s new policy statement is the delegation of greater
authority to the country level, by building on CIDA Project Support Units (PSUs) with national
capacity rather than CIDA headquarters staff. One option would be to extend the responsibility of
these PSUs to include policy coherence (in which case they would be renamed Policy and Project
Support Units or PPSUs.) In this vein, the 2002-2007 country strategy for Jamaica has already intro-
duced an enhanced information-gathering and analytical role for the PSUs, while noting the impor-
tance of close communication with CIDA headquarters in order to assure coherence with Jamaican
partners.22
There was general agreement that it made sense for CIDA to focus more at the macro, policy and
program levels, and less on individual projects, unless these are longer-term and fairly large. The
Canada funds available through the embassy or high commission are a vehicle for short-term initia-
tives but even those could be more strategically used, for example, as action research initiatives to
test an emerging area or priority.23
Canada has continued to participate in several committees created to coordinate donors’ program-
ming with recipient policies. There is still much work to be done to minimize the incoherence
between donors — even in a country like Mali which was the subject of an earlier study by the
OECD that made a strong case for greater donor coordination. A related issue raised was the process
involved in transmitting the results of these coordinating processes to CIDA’s partner agencies — in
Bangladesh for instance it was noted that some of CIDA’s largest partners in the micro-finance area
were not involved let alone familiar with the work undertaken by the local consultation group on
micro-finance, which was led by Canada at the time.
The plethora of Canadian actors in the countries studied included the private sector as well as
NGOs. Typically CIDA has had stronger linkages with most NGOs and for-profit companies acting
as CEAs. Linkages with private sector companies operating outside CIDA programming are far less
regular. In the worst case scenario, this can lead to CIDA’s poverty reduction efforts being under-
mined; in others there may be missed opportunities for encouraging companies to make a greater
contribution, for instance, to poverty reduction, sustainable development, and gender equality.
Examples of both, are, respectively the Sadiola gold mine in Mali and various ALCAN and
Scotiabank community projects in Jamaica. It is important for CIDA to be aware of Canadian private
sector involvement in its leading partner countries — not just their community activities but the full
range — in order to begin this process of dialogue and then to build coherence between all Canadian
actors there. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), through its
embassies, should facilitate this dialogue — the Mali report recommends reviving a coordinating
committee that used to meet regularly if somewhat informally for this very purpose. In Jamaica the
vehicle may be the Canada-Jamaica Business Council.
Within Ottawa, the issue of vertical coherence was particularly pronounced in the context of the
relations between CIDA’s policies, and those set out in the 1995 foreign policy statement, Canada in
the World. Tensions arose when the three principal objectives of prosperity, security and values
appeared to subordinate CIDA’s own goals of poverty reduction, as in the case of certain trade poli-
cies. Of course there were many potential synergies, and in some cases overlapping interests, as with
DFAIT’s Global and Human Issues Bureau, and especially after it began to work on human security.
While much of the focus has shifted to the horizontal level, as discussed below, there is still a con-
cern about subordination, and the possibility of aid being co-opted by other priorities, such as
national security and economic well-being.   
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Horizontal coherence
CIDA has begun to work more closely with other Canadian government departments (OGDs), espe-
cially DFAIT. This is evident at the corporate level, especially in Policy Branch, and also at the coun-
try-desk level. Certainly there is discussion with DFAIT about country strategies, at the time of
formulation. Recent country programming documents note a commitment to greater coherence in
Canada’s aid and non-aid policies.24 Typically there are fewer resources in DFAIT (at least in
Ottawa) to track developments in smaller countries, let alone to design a strategy for Canadian pol-
icy coherence, leaving CIDA to take the lead. Policy coherence requires not only political commit-
ment, but also resources to design and monitor. If DFAIT lacks the resources, as is frequently the
case, then these may be provided by CIDA.
An area of some contention until quite recently concerned Canadian trade policy toward Bangladesh
and other Least Developed Countries (LDCs). After considerable inter-departmental dialogue as
well as external discussion and pressure, a decision was finally taken in June 2002 to remove all tariffs
and quotas of all imports from all LDCs from January 2003 (with the exception of certain dairy
products, eggs, and poultry). Bangladesh stands to be a major beneficiary of this initiative. There is
still scope for CIDA to ensure that Canadian trade policy positions in the WTO support
Bangladesh, Mali and other LDCs, notably in the area of agricultural subsidies, food security, and
Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).  
There is further work to be done on trade policy, more generally. Non-LDCs like Jamaica continue
to face barriers to the Canadian market, notably for clothing. All developing countries will be look-
ing to Canada to ensure that their special and differential needs are accommodated in the WTO
rules during the ongoing Doha negotiations. For instance, in agriculture many want to be able to use
safeguards against import surges or other measures against subsidized imports. The Caribbean has
begun to negotiate a free trade agreement with Canada and there is role for CIDA to play in elabo-
rating approaches that take into account the Caribbean’s particular structural constraints and devel-
opment needs.
Both the Bangladesh and Jamaica cases note that CIDA is complementing its work on the trade pol-
icy front with capacity-building measures, to strengthen partners’ negotiating capacities. Even here
there is scope for increasing the linkages to be made with poverty reduction — for example in the
case of the Regional Negotiating Machinery to suggest more work be done on the implications of
alternative trade policies for the poorest people in the Caribbean.  
In other policy areas, several other departments were involved in the three countries studied, where
they often acted as CEAs of CIDA projects. But they otherwise did not always collaborate with
CIDA, and in some cases were not familiar with CIDA’s country-specific goals and objectives. This
means that potential complementarities or contradictions with CIDA’s poverty reduction objectives
were not explored.  
Besides trade, there were a few examples of policy coherence issues with OGDs. Debt remains a
major constraint on many governments’ public spending. In Jamaica, for instance, debt servicing
absorbed two-thirds of the annual budget in recent years. Canada’s decision to write off C$18 mil-
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lion of outstanding loans in 2001 helped to reduce this problem slightly, though more significant
action is needed at the multilateral level. This is an area for further collaboration between CIDA and
Finance Canada.
Immigration policy was another area noted in the Jamaica and Mali cases. In Jamaica, the issue con-
cerned both the recruitment of health professionals and the migrant farmworker program. Neither
have involved CIDA input to determine how best to mitigate negative impacts (in the first example)
or to maximize the development contribution (in the second). In Mali, changes in Canadian proce-
dures for visa applications were made without taking into account the problems created for business
people. With a number of new initiatives being considered by Citizenship and Immigration Canada
(CIC) in response to labour market needs identified by Human Resources Development Canada
(HRDC), it would be timely for CIDA to meet with CIC/HRDC to discuss the complex relation-
ships between poverty, migration, and development and to consider how to achieve policy coherence
in this area.
There could also have been greater collaboration on export credit and risk insurance with the Crown
corporation, Export Development Canada (EDC). One of the problems confronted in the country-
level research was the lack of company- and even country-specific information about EDC financial
support. While EDC has adopted an increasingly commercial focus, it has been encouraged to adopt
certain policies, such as policies on environmental review, corporate social responsibility, business
ethics, and public disclosure. But, it has not worked with CIDA to determine how the projects it
might finance would contribute to meeting CIDA’s poverty reduction objectives. Yet, this is an area
where further collaboration with CIDA could contribute to policy coherence. Similarly, any finance
for the Canadian private sector through the newly created fund for Africa, or any eventual Canadian
development finance institution, should be expected to fit within CIDA’s poverty reduction frame-
work. 
Finally, another factor to take into account has been the emergence of provincial offices for interna-
tional relations. In Quebec, the ministry has created an aid secretariat, which funded a project in
Mali. Without better communication between the two levels of government, opportunities for con-
certed action to reduce poverty may be missed.   
The Canada-based study underlined the growing interest in international development amongst
many OGDs — and the wide range of OGD policies and activities that affect developing
countries — and a recognition of the importance of working more closely with CIDA. At the same
time, this has generated some tensions about competing mandates and access to resources. In
response, a number of formal and informal coordination mechanisms have emerged, as officials
attempt to ensure greater complementarity and even coherence in their policies and actions.
Canada’s experience in this regard is not unique — most developed countries are reviewing their pol-
icy frameworks and administrative structures in order to enhance their foreign policies and especially
the effectiveness of their support of poverty reduction in developing countries. As noted earlier, sev-
eral international organizations are also considering how to promote policy coherence multilaterally.
While no ideal structure has emerged, there are some common elements that are worth considering.
A formal framework, with strong political endorsement, such as a White Paper, can be important for
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encouraging all government departments to give serious attention to the issue of policy coherence
and poverty reduction. In Canada’s case this would help to set out how the various government
departments, agencies, and Crown corporations should complement CIDA’s policies and program-
ming directed at poverty reduction.  Progress in meeting the goals of the White Paper could be the
subject of an annual development policy review, conducted by CIDA, DFAIT, and other leading
departments and agencies, and/or monitored by a policy coherence secretariat. In the interim, CIDA
could begin to draw up policy coherence profiles for those countries with which it is proposing
enhanced partnerships; these would be used as a basis for discussing how to promote more coherent
policies toward that country through integrated country strategies.
There is a wide range of other formal and informal mechanisms that have been used to coordinate
policies and activities involving development issues, ranging from a special coordinator for Haiti, to
interdepartmental working groups created by CIDA’s Asia Branch, participation by CIDA’s Gender
Equality Division in an interdepartmental group on gender equality, and secondment of staff
between departments. Further initiatives such as the Canadian Centre for Management
Development’s (CCMD) Partnership for International Cooperation, provide additional opportuni-
ties for fostering understanding of CIDA’s priorities and a more collaborative approach to respond-
ing to developing country needs. At the same time there are increasing opportunities for CIDA to
learn of OGD interests and to suggest ways of making them more coherent with poverty reduction.
Finally, there are lessons to be drawn from other approaches such as the Voluntary Sector Initiative
and the Policy Research Initiative. 
10
Recommendations
A number of different priorities and ideas emerged for enhancing Canadian policy coherence:  
• Review of internal policies – CIDA needs to regularly review the coherence of its own internal poli-
cies with poverty reduction, and the relationship of its policies to those of recipient governments
and other development partners.
• Adopting a White Paper on Poverty Coherence and Poverty Reduction – this would establish goals and
procedures, and thus create a solid framework within which to guide, monitor and evaluate
OGDs’ policies and practices as they affect poverty reduction in developing countries. To be
effective it would need strong political commitment and support from the Prime Minister’s
Office.
• Improved communication and sharing of information and policies and activities in particular countries –
this is a minimum. It should include activities of Canadian government departments and agen-
cies as well as those being implemented or funded by Canadian private sector and non-
governmental organizations. The information should be shared amongst all Canadian groups, in
particular to ensure that those not directly involved with CIDA are aware of CIDA’s policies with
respect to poverty reduction. 
• Integrated country strategies – these would include the roles and objectives of OGDs, as well as the
parts to be played by the Canadian private sector and NGOs. In recognition of resource con-
straints these could be produced for the countries on which CIDA is now proposing to concen-
trate its aid (“enhanced partners”). Another approach might be at the regional level, building on
the example of CIDA’s regional frameworks but including OGDs and Canadian actors.
• Policy and Project Units – these would expand on the existing CIDA Project Support Units, with
the responsibility to ensure Canadian aid is more effective and more coherent with recipient
governments’ poverty reduction efforts as well as the efforts of other donors, and to monitor
Canada’s non-aid relations with partner countries to ensure the coherence of Canadian policies.
The PPUs could coordinate feedback from partner countries on the implications of Canadian
policies and practices across the board (rather than limiting themselves to Canadian aid policies
and programming).
• Regular consultations about country strategies with non-government groups, as well as governments, in
partner countries – while such consultations have taken place in the past, they need to be regular-




“[O]nly a minority of development agencies and their governments appear to have taken concrete
steps to ensure that their domestic policies are consistent with the goal of poverty reduction….”
OECD/DAC, DAC Scoping Study of Donor Poverty Reduction Policies and Practices, 1999, p. xv.
“In its broadest sense, coherence implies an overall state of mutual consistency among different
policies.” OECD, Building Policy Coherence, 1996, p. 8. 
“Reducing poverty requires better coherence in government policies affecting development. Key
policy areas with potentially strong poverty reduction impacts include debt relief, trade, invest-
ment, agriculture, the environment, migration, health research, security and arms sales.”  OECD,
The DAC Guidelines for Poverty Reduction, 2001, p. 10.
“CIDA will continue to assess opportunities to improve policy coherence in the Government of
Canada’s policies affecting developing countries and is committed to working with other govern-
ment agencies to this end.” CIDA, Canada Making a Difference in the World. A Policy Statement on
Strengthening Aid Effectiveness, 2002.
This study is concerned with the issue of policy coherence in the context of Canadian policies toward




The concept of policy coherence has mostly been used within the context of development coopera-
tion (as elaborated further in Section 2 of this report). However, its application is potentially much
broader. In essence it refers to ensuring that policies are coordinated and complementary or at least
not contradictory. Complete coherence across a broad range of government policies is unlikely
except where the objective is set at a very general level, such as the promotion of national interests.
But it is a useful concept in that it helps to highlight where policies undermine each other and where
they can complement each other. In particular, policy coherence can be used to assess the relation-
ship between a primary set of government policies, with a relatively narrow objective, and a second-
ary set of other government policies, with a broader and more varied range of objectives. It would be
unusual for the second set always to reinforce the first; in fact conflicts may well arise. Policy coher-
ence encourages governments to consider whether their secondary actions undermine their primary
ones — and if so, whether alternative policies or programs might be more compatible, and if not,
whether additional efforts in the primary are needed. Policy coherence, therefore, requires an inter-





“Coherence may, accordingly, be defined as a policy whose objectives, within a given policy
framework, are internally consistent and attuned to objectives pursued within other policy
frameworks of the system — as a minimum, these objectives should not be conflicting; where
strategies and mechanisms are attuned to the objectives, they should, as a minimum, not con-
flict with the objectives or with the intentions and motives on which these are based; and
where the outcome is corresponding to the intentions and objectives, it should, as a mini-
mum, not conflict with these.”25
Why does policy coherence matter?
There are several reasons for addressing policy coherence. Principal among these is the need to
ensure that the use of scarce resources in aid programs is not undermined by the adoption of other
policies with conflicting objectives and outcomes. More positively, there is a sense that effective
coordination of non-aid policies can help to reinforce aid programs. In some cases, such positive
externalities may not be realized through oversight. The mechanisms to ensure that other depart-
ments’ policies or programs complement the work of aid agencies may not be in place. In other
cases, the mechanisms may exist but the political will does not — until the benefits (or costs) of pol-
icy coherence (or incoherence) are more clearly visible. 
Why poverty reduction and policy coherence?
The focus here is on the linkage of policy coherence to poverty reduction. It may be possible to
make policies toward developing countries more coherent, particularly when the goal is to promote a
donor’s domestic interests. The challenge is whether policies can be made more coherent around the
goal of poverty reduction in developing countries. It is an important challenge given that the number
of people in the world living in poverty continues to grow at the same time that official financial
transfers to developing countries have fallen. Ensuring that this aid is complemented by a set of
“pro-poor” non-aid policies is a key task for donors committed to poverty reduction. A strong set of
pro-poor policies outside the aid arena might be important to ensure that non-aid resource flows or
initiatives are geared to poverty reduction.  
Project background
The North-South Institute (NSI) has long been an advocate of greater policy coherence in Canada’s
relations with developing countries. Since its early studies on protectionism, trade and adjustment in
Canada, it has drawn attention to the negative effects of trade policies on several of Canada’s aid ben-
eficiaries. Other work has underlined the need to ensure policies on economic reform do not under-
mine the struggle for social development and gender equality.26 In its submission to the Special Joint
Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy in 1994, NSI called for a greater
emphasis on policy coherence.  
“We need to:
• Create structures within government to ensure greater coherence between our different policies
toward developing countries, including the adoption of a country-strategy framework.
15
• Strengthen cooperation outside government between different development partners.”27
We advanced the idea of designing a “country strategy framework” that would bring together
Canadian efforts in various areas, linking government policies that have differing mandates and
objectives, including our aid program, our trade relations, our investment and debt relations, our
political relations (e.g., involving human rights issues), and even our “people” (e.g., immigration)
relations. The aim would be to review the impact of government policies on poverty alleviation in
developing countries and to determine opportunities for their better integration.
The topic was subsequently raised in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In its 1997 annual report,
amongst four priorities for 1998, the DAC highlighted “the need to bring development cooperation
squarely within a coherent policy environment in relations between industrialized and developing
countries, and a need to give development objectives far greater weight than at present.”28 The DAC
Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, adopted in 2001, included an illustrative checklist to guide gov-
ernment efforts to increase policy coherence.  
Structure of the research
The NSI study was designed to involve two parallel and complementary phases. The first was an
overview of Canadian relations with developing countries, how these are managed, and to what
effect. This Canada-based work involved desk research and interviews primarily with members of
government as well as a smaller number of interviews with representatives of the private sector and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
The second phase focused on specific developing-country experiences with Canadian foreign policy
instruments. Field research in Bangladesh, Jamaica, and Mali examined details of Canada’s aid, trade,
investment, financial, diplomatic, and other relations, and the dynamics associated with the differing
mandates and objectives of each. This was the basis for an assessment of the overall impact of
Canadian foreign relations on poverty reduction efforts in each country.
Country-specific questions included:
• How do non-aid policies affect Canadian anti-poverty efforts in developing countries?
• Do Canadian aid and non-aid policies complement each other and the efforts of local partners?
And if so, how?
• What systems exist locally for enhancing the coherence of relations with donor countries in gen-
eral and Canada in particular?
Canada-based research
Methodology. In the Canada-based study, we carried out a literature review, a telephone survey “map-
ping” the international activities of all government departments and other public agencies, and a
series of structured interviews with key policy makers and analysts in a number of departments.
Types and numbers of people interviewed. In total, some 40 people were interviewed in seven depart-
ments or agencies: CIDA, DFAIT, Finance, Environment, Health, the Privy Council Office, and the
Policy Research Secretariat. Their positions ranged up to deputy minister. All interviews were con-
ducted on a non-attributable basis. 
Country case studies
The country selection criteria included a range of issues: importance to Canada, importance of
Canada, income levels, geographical balance, language balance, and the avoidance of special cases.  
Bangladesh 
Rationale for choice. The choice of Bangladesh reflected the country’s status for a number of years as
one of the largest recipients of Canadian aid, and one where Canada is a relatively important donor.
It is also one of the least-developed countries.  
Fieldwork was undertaken in April-May 1999 and June 2000, when several interviews were organ-
ized first in Ottawa and then in Dhaka with representatives of the Canadian and Bangladesh govern-
ments, the NGO community, private sector, other donors, and intergovernmental agencies. 
Mali 
Rationale for choice. Mali was chosen as a representative francophone country, being one of the larger
francophone recipients of Canadian aid in Africa. While it ranked 17th among all countries in terms
of Canadian bilateral aid, Canada ranked sixth among bilateral donors (in 1997). Mali was also of
interest as it had been the focus of a major study of European Union (EU) aid. Finally, it is also a
least-developed country.
Fieldwork took place in Ottawa from May to July 1999, and in Mali during August 1999. Some 70
people were interviewed, representing the Canadian and Malian governments, NGOs, other donors,
and the private sector. The researchers also made a field trip to one of the poorest regions in Mali,
where a Canadian company is involved in a gold mine.  
Jamaica 
Rationale for choice. While Jamaica is a much smaller recipient of Canadian aid, Canada enjoys a lead-
ing presence with the fourth largest aid program, and strong non-aid relationships (immigration,
investment, and trade). Fieldwork occurred in July 1999 in Ottawa and in September-October 1999
as well as January-April 2000 in Jamaica. 
Structure of report
This report presents the findings of the Ottawa-based research, which focused on the broader issues
of policy coherence and poverty reduction, drawing as relevant from the country case studies, all of
which are now available from NSI (on paper or electronically from the website at 
http://www.nsi-ins.ca). Section 2 presents a conceptual framework; Section 3 reviews how coherence
has been addressed in other countries/organizations; Section 4 focuses on coherence in Canada; and
some conclusions are drawn in Section 5. The results of all four reports from this Poverty and Policy
Coherence project are integrated in the Executive Summary. 
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The Concept of Policy Coherence 
Origins of the concept
The idea of policy coherence is not new though the terminology may be. It is the way in which it has
been defined that has changed over time. Moreover, application of the concept and attempts to
implement it have varied both over time and between countries or international organizations which
have used the term.
The broadly defined concept of “policy coherence” in the context of development cooperation is a
decade old. In a paper written for the OECD by Kiichiro Fukasaku and Denizhan Erocal,29 the
authors argued that the theme of policy coherence was one of the main issues confronting donors in
the 1990s. With the blurring of domestic and international issues, governments could no longer
overlook questions such as good governance, participatory development, military spending, migra-
tion, and trade in narcotics as they had during the Cold War.30
The coordination of non-aid policies with aid was now required for development cooperation to
achieve the objectives of development and poverty reduction.31 Failure to do so, it was believed,
might pose a threat to developed countries because deteriorating economic and social conditions
elsewhere could cause domestic and regional political instability. In turn, this would destabilize the
international order. The aim of coherence was to ensure that successful developing countries became
future partners integrated into the world economy on the same level as developed countries.32
Despite the recent emphasis on policy coherence, forms of policy coordination have been an issue
for over 30 years in the development community. In the 1960s, policy coordination was considered
essential for the effectiveness of national (i.e., developing country) government planning — interest-
ingly this is similar to the approach of the World Bank in its Comprehensive Development
Framework (CDF) introduced at the end of the 1990s (see Section 3). In the 1970s, the focus was on
integrated development, in the 1980s on structural adjustment, and in the early 1990s on governance
and democratization.33
While the issue of Northern governments’ policies was raised, it was primarily in the context of their
development cooperation policies as they related to Southern government policy priorities. An
exception was the suggestion in the New International Economic Order (NIEO) debates of the late
1970s that changes in Northern economic policies were essential to complement Southern develop-
ment efforts.  
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But since the mid-1990s, there has been growing recognition of the need to go beyond the scope of
traditional development cooperation policies and the Southern focus, although they remain key
components. Today, the concept embodies the need to ensure, at best, that donors’ aid and non-aid
policies complement one another and those of the Southern governments or, at worst, that donors’
aid and non-aid policies do not interfere with one another and the policies of  recipients. The need
for policy coherence in this broader sense has perhaps also been increased by the multiplicity of
objectives now encompassed in development cooperation, going beyond poverty reduction to
include political, social, cultural, and environmental aspects.  
Typologies of coherence
A major contribution to the definition of policy coherence has been made by a number of European
researchers who have studied the development cooperation policies of the EU and European states.34
These studies identify coherence at a variety of levels:
• coherence between development policies 
• coherence between development and other policies (domestic, foreign) 
• coherence between donor and recipient policies 
• coherence between donors’ development policies
• institutional coherence 
According to one author, it is important to recognize that “policies are a function of conflict and
debate within government organizations, and are subject to public pressures and contending political
considerations. Policy outcomes rarely correspond to policy intentions.”35
Institutional coherence, which concerns the institutions in charge of implementing official policies,
involves both a vertical and a horizontal component.36 Horizontal incoherence may result from the
division of responsibilities between various aspects of development initiatives as well as branches of
the same donor agency. One example is the division between the technical and geographical divisions
within an agency. Another source of horizontal incoherence may reflect differences between the
development-promoting institution and other foreign affairs institutions of the same government.
Foreign affairs, by definition, cover a wide range of issues of which development is but one (see
Section 3).
Vertical coherence refers to the relations between (i) domestic donor agencies and multilateral donor
agencies and (ii) between the nexus of bilateral/multilateral donor agencies and the recipient coun-
tries. Multilateral agencies are subject to pressures from powerful states. This pressure is found in
day-to-day activities where multilateral agencies perform coordinating functions within recipient
countries. On the recipients’ side, multilateral donor agencies may undermine the sovereignty of
developing countries by collectively influencing recipient policies. Where they have no collective
vision, donors may undermine national development efforts by requiring recipients to address con-
tradictory demands.
According to Mark Robinson, coherent policy is impossible due to the variety of interests involved in
development promotion. The more sceptical view holds that self-interests prevail over altruism while
the less sceptical view maintains that implementation distorts policy intentions when sensitive issues
are concerned.37 The resulting incoherence may therefore be intended or unintended.
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Policy coherence and development assistance
Within the OECD, and particularly the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the concept of
policy coherence has become widely used. In earlier days, considerable emphasis was placed on the
need for donors to coordinate aid policies, programs, and projects, both with each other and with
recipient governments. But coherence of a broader range of policies (finance, trade, immigration,
etc.) is now considered an essential complement. For instance, in 1996, the DAC produced an ambi-
tious agenda in its Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation. Besides
setting goals in the areas of primary education, gender disparity in education, child and maternal
mortality, reproductive health care, and environmental sustainability, this DAC policy document
called for halving the proportion of people in extreme poverty by 2015.  
The DAC recognized the importance of effective development partnerships if such goals were to be
met, with developing countries being the starting point for organizing cooperation. Members also
agreed to do more to ensure that their other policies reinforced their cooperation efforts.38 More
specifically, in its 1997 annual report, amongst its four priorities for 1998, the DAC highlighted “the
need to bring development cooperation squarely within a coherent policy environment in relations
between industrialized and developing countries, and a need to give development objectives far
greater weight than at present”.39
These ideas were further elaborated in the DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction released in 2001.
Besides addressing key issues such as improving relations with development partners and strengthen-
ing development strategies, it set out ways to enhance policy coherence, including an illustrative
checklist for governments to consider in certain policy areas — trade and investment, international
finance, food and agriculture, natural resources and environmental sustainability, social issues, and
governance and conflict.  
Finally, some of the ideas elaborated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in
its 1999 volume on global public goods, are relevant to discussions of policy coherence.40 Essentially
the proposition is that international cooperation may be considered a form of public good, requiring
mechanisms for collective action at the global level. But it will also require governments to consider
international externalities when making national policies that might otherwise seem to have purely
domestic effects.41 With globalization, externalities are increasingly being borne or enjoyed by peo-
ple in other countries. International cooperation must start at home, with governments ensuring first
that they know the spillover effects of their policies42 and second, that they take measures to mini-
mize the negative and maximize the positive externalities.  
This concept could be extrapolated at the national level to ensure that different departments take
into account the externalities of their policies and programs. The UNDP report recommended that
ministries with greater externalities, such as finance, trade, environment, health, and labour, develop
a clear mandate for international cooperation and create a dual budget — one for domestic expendi-




Alternatively, development agencies and foreign affairs ministries could add global public goods
accounts to traditional aid allocation.44 This would be important also for generating a new funding
source for financing international public goods rather than relying on traditional aid resources,
which are normally targeted at the development concerns of recipient countries. (On the other hand,
one concern might be that such accounting would diminish the flow of aid resources to developing
countries, if donor governments were able to consider global public goods spending as aid.)
There has been considerably more discussion of policy coherence in an applied context, which is
considered in Section 3. 
Current Applications
This section outlines the application of the concept of policy coherence. The primary focus is on the
European Union and key countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee where its
use has been more pronounced. In addition we refer briefly to other organizations (such as the
World Bank and the World Trade Organization-WTO) where the concept has been introduced,
even if sometimes following a somewhat different approach, as in the case of the World Bank’s
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF).   
Policy coherence in the European Union
The EU’s development cooperation activities pose the challenge of policy coherence in two ways.
First is the coherence between the EU’s aid policies and programs and those of each member state.
Second is the coherence of various international activities of the EU. It is the latter that is of most
interest to this report. The sui generis character of the EU and of its institutional structures makes it
difficult to compare with other donors. However, the decision-making processes within the
European Commission and its relations with other institutions may provide certain insights for
countries like Canada. 
Coherence in the Treaty of Maastricht
Prior to the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht that founded the European Union, the development coopera-
tion policy of the EU and those of member states coexisted. In the areas of foreign trade and emer-
gency aid, the European Community possessed exclusive jurisdiction. In the areas of development
cooperation and food aid, the member states granted the Community the mandate to intervene but
remained legally in charge. 
The Treaty of Maastricht implied a contractual transfer of power to the Union level. Article C pro-
vides a legal basis for external policy coherence by stipulating that the external policies of the EU
should be “consistent” with one another.45 While the treaty is older than most references to policy
coherence in OECD documents, all interpretations given to consistency in the EU have been in line
with the DAC’s definition of policy coherence. 
Decision-making structure of the EU
There are three main institutions that participate in the decision-making process:
• The European Commission proposes policies that are submitted for approval to the European
Council of Ministers representing member states’ governments;
• The European Council is the actual decision-making body where proposals are put to a




for development). Depending on the issue, the majority of member states required to make a
proposal binding under Community law varies from a qualified majority (e.g., trade and
emergency aid) to unanimity (e.g., Common Foreign and Security Policy);
• The European Parliament is elected by universal suffrage and represents the public in
European ridings. With respect to international development, the Parliament can request
action on human rights on the part of the EU. As well, in budgetary matters, it has the
power to allocate money to budget lines and to create new ones. This gives Parliament
potential influence on development policy. However, the main EU financing instrument for
development cooperation, the European Development Fund (EDF), is not under the juris-
diction of the Parliament. Parliament has established various committees to track and influ-
ence the work of the Commission and the Councils.
Since proposals for all EU policies emanate from the Commission, the initial locus of (in)coherence
is the Commission, its directorates-general (DGs), and the commissioners at their head. Prior to the
collective resignation of the Commission in mid-1999, five of 20 commissioners and three DGs had
portfolios with a direct impact on development:
• DG I/A: Foreign political affairs;
• DG I/B: North-South relations;
• DG VIII: Development (dealing with African, Caribbean and Pacific signatories of the Lomé
Convention).
The absence of standard criteria and procedures to administer programs led to incoherent applica-
tion.46 Furthermore, these DGs did not devise and implement policy autonomously since the
Commission could only propose policy approved by the Council. The EDF is under the jurisdiction
of the Council. This points to a vertical relationship between the EU and its member states, with the
EU being subordinate in the area of Official Development Assistance (ODA).
A new structure was introduced in late 1999, in which three commissioners were given portfolios
with development cooperation implications: 47
• The Commissioner for External Relations was responsible for coordination of all external poli-
cies, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and EU delegations abroad. S/he was
responsible for the DG for External Relations and the Common Service for External
Relations (CSER, a separate directorate) created in 1998. In addition to its responsibilities
for the ACP, the DG for External Relations took over the aid programs to Asia and Latin
America, the Mediterranean, the former Soviet Union, and some European countries (e.g.,
Albania). Management of Community Aid (delivered by the CSER) to non-member coun-
tries was under the responsibility of the commissioner;
• The Commissioner for Development was responsible for development cooperation and humani-
tarian aid. S/he was responsible for the DG for Development and the European Community
Humanitarian Office (ECHO), which oversaw the implementation of emergency humanitar-
ian aid;
• The Trade Commissioner was responsible for trade policy and its instruments, and the DG for
Trade.
The Commissioner for External Relations was expected to consult the geographical desks and obtain
the agreement of the Commissioner for Development when dealing with Common Foreign and
Security Policy (see the figure below for the structure of the EU Commission with respect to devel-
opment cooperation).
The structure provided for coherence in policy-making to the extent that the Commissioner for
External Relations was the focal point for all external relations activities. The CSER ensured institu-
tional coherence in the operationalization of policy, except with respect to trade despite its impor-
tance for development. In addition, there were concerns about the separation of policy-making by
the Directorate-General from policy implementation by the CSER. The lack of a common hierarchy
also made monitoring, evaluation, and coordination difficult.48 The Council, which remained
responsible for final decisions, was the second principal forum where issues of consistency, or a lack
of consistency, could be discussed. 
As part of ongoing efforts to improve the Commission’s efficiency, further changes were made in
November 2000, when the EC adopted a new development policy, with poverty reduction as the
central objective. Country strategy papers were to provide for the integration of aid, trade, and polit-
ical dimensions. In January 2001, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO) was set up to harmo-
nize aid procedures for all regions. 
In June 2002, the EU made a more radical move to coordinate foreign policies when it decided to
disband as of 2004 the Development Council, which had been in charge of monitoring EC poverty
reduction efforts. Instead its work will be subsumed by a new General Affairs and External Relations
Council. In parallel, some NGOs expected that the DG for Development might be merged into the
DG for External Relations, and the Development Committee of the European Parliament might





















Structure of the European Commission
While recognizing that these moves might help to rationalize and make EU external policies toward
developing countries more coherent, initial responses from the development community have been
quite critical. A particular concern is that the attention given to poverty eradication will diminish rel-
ative to external political, commercial, and security interests, and moreover that development coop-
eration would be defined in a framework dominated by these other interests.49 Aid delivery will be
managed by a separate agency, but aid policies will be set within the overall external relations frame-
work — not within a distinct development cooperation framework. The disappearance of the
Development Committee would further lower the visibility of development issues within the EU. In
response, some groups have called for measures to strengthen the legal basis for development policy
in the Convention on the Future of Europe. Another suggestion has been that the new General
Affairs and External Relations Council commit to regular meetings focused exclusively on develop-
ment policy.50
Policy coherence in the DAC countries
As mentioned earlier, the OECD’s DAC has sought for several years to promote coherence of its
members’ policies toward developing countries. The focus has varied from donor aid policies within
a particular recipient country, to ensuring more consistency within individual donor agencies, and
more recently to coordination of donor aid and non-aid policies. 
The thrust of donor aid coordination is now on effective partnerships with recipient countries.
Following a case study of Mali and broad consultations in others, in 1998 the DAC developed a
series of partnership tests — such as pooling funds for sector support and untying aid.51 Other stud-
ies have underlined how difficult it has been for countries to take ownership of their development
programs.52 Pressure to move further in this direction will accelerate with the implementation of the
World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSPs) (see below). 
The DAC has sought to enhance its members’ commitment to poverty reduction by examining how
far this is matched in each donor agency by “a coherent conceptualization of poverty and set of
strategies for its reduction.”53 The DAC Scoping Study of Donor Poverty Reduction Policies and Practices
found that “poverty reduction goals and strategies must be mainstreamed throughout the agency if
they are to translate into concrete benefits for poor people.” It identified four key factors for effec-
tive mainstreaming — positive incentives, agency organization, gender dimensions, and poverty-ori-
ented monitoring and evaluation systems.54
Building on earlier work by the DAC’s Informal Network on Poverty Reduction, in 2001 the DAC
produced a set of guidelines on poverty reduction.55 Besides advice on partnerships and aid program-
ming, it set out several issues for policy coherence falling into seven broad areas:
1. foreign trade and investment;
2. food and agriculture;
3. natural resources and environmental sustainability;
4. governance;
5. conflict and security; 
24
6. social issues; and 
7. broad economic and financial issues. 
It also underlined the importance of associated institutional changes. An illustrative checklist to
encourage and assist OECD governments included both procedures for instituting a coherence sys-
tem and a series of substantive items for policy review. The report noted that the appropriate proce-
dures and relevant issues may vary from one country to another, and also that whatever is adopted
needs to be constantly reviewed, as both policy contexts and issues can change rapidly, requiring dif-
ferent responses.56 It underlined the scope for action and the key role that development agencies
have in ensuring this takes place: 
“Making policies coherent across government is a complex process. But there are ways in
which much can be achieved. Examples are establishing a political mechanism, such as an
interagency working group, for exchange and consultation within and across government
ministries and departments; developing a government-wide policy brief on poverty reduc-
tion; systematically vetting legislation for its coherence with reducing poverty, and establish-
ing cross-ministerial task forces for emerging issues, such as conflict prevention.”57
“Development agencies have an important role — as advocates for development objectives
and for ensuring that mechanisms exist for achieving policy coherence in practice. These
mechanisms for policy coherence would apply, of course, to both development and other
national objectives. Formal sessions are an invaluable tool for improving coherence, but a
culture of informal contact is also critical.”58
These guidelines have also helped to shape the DAC peer review of donors, with reviews now regu-
larly including a chapter on policy coherence. In the evaluation of Canadian development coopera-
tion in 2002, careful attention was given to its policy coherence efforts (mechanisms, trade and
development, export credits, migration, foreign investment and aid untying).59
DAC national mechanisms
In a July 1999 report, the OECD’s DAC stated that it is “unlikely that an ‘ideal’ organizational
framework for the DAC development cooperation programmes can be defined”.60 Certainly, the
management systems for development assistance vary across DAC countries, but the relation of
ODA to foreign affairs remains a central element in each country. 
Five basic models of ODA management systems can be delineated:61
1. Integrated Ministry of Foreign Affairs: This model is characterized by the “de-compartmental-
ization” of issue areas within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Development is not treated as a
separate aspect of foreign relations but as an integral part of relations with regions or coun-
tries with ODA relevance. For each region, foreign relations, trade, and development can be
coordinated to minimize incoherence. Countries using this model are Denmark and Finland.
2. Development cooperation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: In this model, the issue areas of
foreign policy, trade, and development are distributed in different directorates with coordi-
nation taking place either horizontally between the directorates or at the head of the min-
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istry (minister or minister’s office). Countries using this model are Austria, Belgium, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, and New Zealand.
3. Policy ministry with separate implementing agency: This model comprises one lead ministry in
charge of developing policy with an agency that implements policy decisions. The lead min-
istry is generally the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while the implementing agency is an aid
agency. An alternative model is a Ministry of Development Cooperation in charge of policy
with another agency in charge of implementation. With a Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
charge, coherence is, in theory, better achieved by virtue of the co-ordination of the various
dimensions of foreign policy. Countries using this model are Luxembourg, Norway, and
Sweden.
4. Autonomous aid agency: In this model, there is one Ministry of Development Co-operation or
one aid agency in charge of both policy-making and implementation. Coherence can be
achieved through coordination with other ministries with international activities, or at the
political level in cabinet or cabinet committees. Countries using this model are Australia,
Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
5. Multiple ministries with separate implementing agencies: In this model, different ministries take
on different aspects of development cooperation. The basic configuration used by the
OECD’s DAC comprises the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a central role, flanked by the
Ministry of Finance and other ministries. In some cases, implementation is left to executing
agencies that respond to the directives emanating from each ministry. Policy coherence can
only be achieved through extensive contacts and dialogue horizontally, across ministries. At
the operational level, the executing agencies may coordinate but remain bound by policy.
Countries using this model are the European Union, France, Greece, Japan, Portugal, Spain,
and Switzerland.
These models clearly constitute ideal types. The structure of any given country’s Official
Development Assistance (ODA) policy-making may call on different aspects of each model. 
Select DAC national models
Of all member countries of the DAC, the following are of particular relevance to the Canadian case,
for various reasons.
United States
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the main instrument of the
United States’ bilateral aid effort. USAID is an independent agency and has primary responsibility
for promoting sustainable development, providing humanitarian assistance on a bilateral basis, and
managing bilateral aid programs and activities. The US aid program is also channeled through the
Treasury (for multilateral development banks), the State Department (for UN programs and some
refugee and humanitarian programs) and the Peace Corps (for the volunteer program). Food aid is
budgeted by the Agriculture Department but, for the most part, managed and implemented by
USAID. The USAID Administrator reports directly to the Secretary of State, rather than the presi-
dent as in the past, and the agency receives foreign policy guidance from the State Department.62
There have been various efforts to create coordination councils and communication linkages among
the Treasury, the State Department, and USAID, dating as far back as the presidencies of Nixon and
Carter. But these have proved inadequate. In particular, State Department attempts to foster coordi-
nation among USAID and other departments or agencies, have been undermined on occasion by the
superior power and differing interests of the Treasury. 
On the technical side, the major problem encountered is a logistical one, namely coordinating the
large number of parties that are required to make a decision (as in the case of the working group on
the World Bank Inspection Panel). The White House’s Council on Economic Competitiveness
coordinated meetings in the absence of a secretariat. Success in bringing together interested parties
was due to the personal linkages, trust, and access to the President of the most senior participants.63
The African Economic Opportunities bill (later known as the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act),
brought before Congress in early 1999, was considered a “coup” and a “big interagency process.” 
United Kingdom
The initial impetus for reform in the British aid machinery was a 1995 Senior Management Review
which recommended delegation, decentralization, and the inclusion of non-aid development issues
in the Overseas Development Administration (ODA).64 In 1997 the British government proceeded
to replace the ODA with a newly created Department for International Development (DFID).
DFID is now under the ministerial responsibility of its own cabinet level Secretary of State and an
Under-Secretary of State, instead of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
who previously oversaw the ODA. As a result, there are now separate departments for foreign affairs
and development cooperation, each responsible before a cabinet minister. A Commonwealth
Development Corporation (CDC) serves as a financing and management tool for third-party
investors.65 DFID’s responsibilities now extend to Central and East European countries and the
Newly Independent States.
Several levels for ensuring coherence exist. In Parliament, a Select Committee on International
Development was created in 1997 to hold hearings and issue publications and recommendations on
ODA-related issues. In the Cabinet, the Secretary of State for International Development is a mem-
ber of several ministerial committees including foreign affairs and defence, and two sub-committees
on conflict and EU trade policy.66 There is also an interdepartmental working group on develop-
ment chaired by the Secretary of State and at which are represented other departments whose poli-
cies affect development. In other interdepartmental committees, DFID is represented independently,
rather than through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as in the past.
A DAC evaluation of British ODA stated that “within DFID the resources and mechanisms for seek-
ing coherence and coordination both within the United Kingdom and in international discussions
are being strengthened”.67 A unit focusing on international trade has been created, which has argued
for paying greater attention to developing country concerns in the WTO. DFID has commissioned
a considerable amount of research on trade and development linkages which has helped to
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strengthen its policy interventions in the UK and the EU. The European Union unit of DFID is also
focused on ensuring coherence and coordination with the EU. At the EU Council on Community
development matters, it is the British Secretary of State for International Development who repre-
sents the UK. 
There has been little evaluation of these recently created coherence mechanisms. From a structural
point of view, however, the presence of the Secretary of State for International Development on a
wide range of committees points to a comprehensive understanding of ODA and the scope for exten-
sive interdepartmental contacts in determining policy. Nonetheless, this has not resolved all policy
inconsistencies. For instance, in 2001 the Trade and Industry Secretary granted an export license for
the sale of a military air traffic control system to Tanzania despite strong opposition from the devel-
opment minister. To limit such occurrences in the future, sustainable development criteria were due
to be written into the export control bill.68 On export credits, the official export credit agency has
introduced a set of environmental and social evaluation criteria. DFID is consulted on sensitive
cases, and the International Development Committee has suggested it play a more systematic screen-
ing role.  
Finally, mention should also be made of the UK Cabinet Office’s Performance and Innovation Unit
(PIU) which was created by Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1998,
“to improve the capacity of Government to address strategic, cross-cutting issues and pro-
mote innovation in the development of policy and in the delivery of the Government’s objec-
tives. The Unit is part of the drive for better, more joined-up Government. It will act as a
resource for the whole of Government, tackling issues on a project basis, and focusing on
long-term problems that cross public sector institutional boundaries.”69
The PIU reports directly to the prime minister. A recent project70 sought to identify a coherent set
of principles for comparing trade with non-trade measures for achieving social, health, and environ-
mental objectives. 
The Netherlands
In 1995, the Dutch government undertook a “decompartmentalization” of foreign policy to improve
policy coherence and ensure better coordination between the ministries involved in foreign policy
matters. The Aid in Progress report of 1996 recommended the integration of aid policy into overall
foreign policy by integrating ODA into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Bilateral policy fol-
lows a thematic structure instead of a geographical one. Geographical desks are within thematic
directorates-general rather than the reverse. There are four directorates-general within MOFA (as
shown in the figure in  Annex 3.1): 
1. Regional and Country Policy (DGRB) 
2. Political Affairs (DGPZ) 
3. International Cooperation (DGIS)  
4. European Cooperation (DGES).
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Aid policy varies from country to country depending on the level of development, with emphasis
being placed on programs rather than projects to ensure in-country coherence.71
There are five foreign policy priorities for ODA and implementation is the responsibility of several
Directorates-General of MOFA. DGIS is responsible for developing policy for several themes of
development cooperation and it assists the Directorate-General for Regional and Country Policy
(DGRB) in developing medium-term regional programs. The DGRB plays a key role in ensuring
coordination between all services of MOFA and other Dutch government departments. The decen-
tralization of spending in 1995 to the field level has given embassies a larger role in aid management
within the general guidelines being given from headquarters.
In the Cabinet, a Council of European and International Affairs was created in 1996 to foster coher-
ence at a political level. The Council’s membership varies according to the agenda but includes the
prime minister (chair) and the Ministers of: Foreign Affairs (coordinator), Finance, Economic
Affairs, Netherlands Antilles and Aruban Affairs, and Development Cooperation as well as the state
secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs.
Most of the recipients of Dutch aid are poor and consequently are not of commercial interest.72 This
may prove to be conducive to coherence in that development policy does not have to accommodate
Dutch national economic interests in the Netherlands’ dealings with developing countries.
Norway
Reform in the Norwegian ODA structure came early in the 1990s with a 1992 White Paper (entitled
Trends in North-South Relations and Norway’s Cooperation with Developing Countries), with further
changes introduced in the late 1990s.73 Norway’s North-South and aid policies are shaped by an
intense dialogue between the government represented by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
International Development and Human Rights and the Norwegian parliament (Storting). The
Storting dominates this policy dialogue and its resolutions on government White Papers are binding
on the government. ODA is integrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
There are four components of Norwegian ODA: 
• Overall policy (development, foreign trade) is developed in the Bilateral Affairs Department
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, though the Norwegian Agency for Development
Cooperation (NORAD) which is a directorate of the ministry, has assumed greater responsi-
bility for formulating country strategies and for policy dialogue with partner countries. All
departments report to both the Foreign Minister and the Minister of International
Development and Human Rights. NORAD offices are integrated with embassies at the field
level, with staff interchange and joint training being encouraged. NORAD and the ministry
share in the implementation of development cooperation with NORAD administering bilat-
eral and long-term assistance while the ministry administers multilateral aid, humanitarian
assistance, and emergency relief. Relations with the Multilateral Development Banks and
United Nations agencies are addressed by the ministry’s Multilateral Department. They are
also under the responsibility of the development minister.
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• Emergency relief (except in Europe) is the responsibility of the Department for Human
Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, and in turn of the development minister.  
• Relations with NGOs are institutionalized, with some 80 organizations receiving funding
from NORAD and the Foreign Affairs Ministry for their longer-term development work
and emergency aid. The government has set up a consultative framework with NGOs and
the business community to address coherence on human rights issues in developing
countries.
Policy coherence in other multilateral organizations
The issue of coherence has been raised within the context of the international economic regime on
several occasions and in various ways.  
The Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(SCFAIT), in its report on Canada and the Future of the WTO noted:
“the need to rethink existing approaches to global economic management, both to preserve
an appropriate scope for democratic policy choice within countries, and to begin to con-
struct a coherent and accountable institutional ‘architecture’ among nations that is capable of
achieving the multilateral cooperation that is now vital in so many areas. The WTO, the
International Financial Institutions, and the United Nations system, however flawed and in
need of reform in each of their parts, must begin to work together more closely in order to
coordinate a process of institutional improvements to the multilateral system as a whole.”74
Similarly, the UN’s Human Development Report 1999 noted that “global decision-making still lacks
coherence and geographic balance, with key decisions being made in different bodies and no clear
mechanism to bring the elements together.”75
The SCFAIT urged Canadian leadership in advancing constructive ideas in this regard, while sug-
gesting that Canada’s own international policy instruments would also benefit from more coordina-
tion and coherence: “The Committee agrees that Canada will hardly be in a position to advance an
agenda within the WTO or elsewhere calling for greater coherence in international governance
structures and processes if we ourselves have not put in place a coherent approach to the foreign and
domestic policies that are needed to respond to the challenges of globalization.”76
A Swiss proposal noted in particular that one of the objectives in the new trade round should be to
foster coherence at the national and international levels between trade policies and other policies
interacting with trade; coherence should involve a review of the relationship between trade and the
environment, finance, development, and transparency.77 At the WTO High Level Symposium on
Trade and Development in March 1999, Pakistan and Indonesia called for “coherence in macroeco-
nomic policies and renewed international development cooperation.”78 The UK noted “the impor-
tance of poverty alleviation and the need for integration of trade policies into a wider set of develop-
ment policies.”79
Writing on “The Coherence Deficit” in 1999, economist Sylvia Ostry observed that pressure on the
WTO to work more closely with the Bretton Woods Institutions had led to agreements with the
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1996 and the World Bank (1997) on a number of process
issues (attendance at meetings and exchange of information, etc.) rather than in any substantive
progress.80 Following the Asian crisis, considerable attention was given to the issue of IMF and
World Bank coherence in the strengthening of the international financial architecture — but much
less to the overlap with the WTO’s current and future agendas.
At Doha in November 2001, WTO members decided to create a working group on trade, debt, and
finance, to consider steps which the WTO might take that would contribute to resolving developing
countries’ debt problems, and how to protect the trading system from the effects of financial and
monetary instability.81 At Monterrey, in March 2002, the consensus document underlined the need
for the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO to address issues of coherence, coordination,
and cooperation in the international monetary, financial, trading, and development systems, while
recognizing that governments needed “to continue to improve our domestic policy coherence
through the continued engagement of our ministries of development, finance, trade and foreign
affairs, as well as our central banks.”82 To date, there have been a number of meetings to discuss col-
laboration between the four institutions, with a high level meeting being planned for April 2003 of
ECOSOC, the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. A key issue will be how to shift the focus of
coherence from the earlier, narrow focus on macroeconomic stability to an emphasis on poverty
reduction and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. 
Finally, mention should be made of the frameworks being used by the World Bank and many donors
in order to promote policy coherence at a national level in developing countries. In the late 1990s,
the Bank introduced the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) which sought to provide a
more inclusive picture of development, to ensure the coherence of policies and programs in develop-
ing countries. It recognized that there must be coherence between the macroeconomic and financial
aspects of development, on one hand, and the structural, social, and human aspects on the other.83 It
was also intended to promote developing-country ownership of their development programs in con-
junction with the international development community, civil society and the private sector.84 The
key elements in a CDF are shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1:  Prerequisites for Sustainable Growth and Poverty Alleviation
Structural Human and Physical Specific sectors
prerequisites social prerequisites prerequisites and strategies
Good and clean Education and knowledge Water and sewerage Rural strategy
government institutions
Roads, transportation, Urban strategy
Effective legal and Health and populations and telecommunications
justice system issues Private sector
Sustainable development,
Well-organized and environmental, and Special national
supervised financial system cultural issues
considerations
Social safety nets and 
programs
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Each of these prerequisites and sectors implied the participation of more than one actor. The players
identified by Wolfensohn were: governments (national, state, city, municipal, regional), multilateral
and bilateral agencies, civil society in all its forms, and the private sector (domestic and foreign).85
The aim was for the CDF to become a tool in greater coordination, transparency, and partnership. It
may be that a matrix approach, similar to the CDF, would help to ensure greater coherence in the
increasingly complex web of Canada’s interactions with developing countries, which is discussed in
the following section.
Since 1999, there has been increasing attention to national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs), raising questions about the continuing significance of the CDF, and countries’ capacities to
engage in both. The following matrix sets out the PRSP-CDF relationship as seen by the Bank. It
underlines that the PRSP is only one element — even if a key one — within the broader and longer-
term framework of the CDF. Nonetheless, a recent assessment by the Bank itself suggests that it has
been difficult to maintain the focus on the CDF. 
“The introduction of the PRSP has helped to promote the formulation of country strategies
that are comprehensive in analysis and balanced in addressing macro, social and structural
issues. However, fewer than half of these countries have medium-term strategies well
anchored on long-term strategies. … The process of strategy formulation is often still domi-
nated by short-term macroeconomic needs, and often fails to achieve a balance in addressing
macroeconomic, social and structural issues.”86
Factors identified as contributing to this problem included the tight time-lines for dealing with debt
problems, limited national planning capacities, and bilateral/international agencies’ reluctance to
align their strategies with those of partner governments.
Table 3.2:  The CDF Matrix
UN Country Long Term Country Partnership Development International




Structural/ Social/ Physical/ Macroeconomic/










MTEF – Mid-term Expenditure Framework prepared by the government
UNDAF – UN  Development Assistance Framework
CAS – World Bank Country Assistance Strategy
PRGF – IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
Source: CDF-PRSP Link, at http://www.worldbank.org/cdf/overview.htm, consulted November 13, 2002
32
33
Annex 3.1: Five Typical Models
Integrated Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Denmark, Finland)
Development cooperation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs


















Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Autonomous aid agency
(Australia, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, United States)
Ministry or agency for
Development Cooperation Other ministries
Policy ministry with separate implementing agency
(Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Implementing agency
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Multiple ministries with separate implementing agencies
(European Union, France, Greece, Japan,87 Portugal, Spain, Switzerland) 
Ministry of Finance Other ministries
Implementing agency Implementing agency
Ministry of Foreign Affairs



































Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister for Development Cooperation




DGRB DGPZ DGIS DGES
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Missions abroad
Policy Coherence in Canada
Canada in the World and Canadian foreign policy
Canada’s development cooperation policy has undergone a number of reviews since the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA) was created in 1968. During this time, CIDA’s relation-
ship with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT, formerly the
Department of External Affairs or DEA) has changed and been the object of ongoing debate.88
Because foreign affairs cover a wide range of issues, including development, the CIDA-DFAIT rela-
tionship is particularly important to the issue of policy coherence.
The most recent review of Canadian foreign policy occurred in the mid-1990s with hearings of the
Special Joint Parliamentary Committee reviewing Canadian foreign policy held in 1994. Following
the publication of its report, the Canadian government tabled its official statement on Canadian for-
eign policy, Canada in the World. It set three objectives for Canada’s foreign relations:
1. The promotion of prosperity and employment;
2. The protection of Canadian security within a stable global framework; and
3. The projection of Canadian values and culture in the world.
In principle, Canada in the World is intended to provide a clear policy framework for all of Canada’s
international activities. Government departments can turn to it for guidance when planning activities
beyond Canadian borders to ensure that they are coherent with Canada’s foreign policy. Department
policies, programs, and projects can be developed and evaluated in light of the three foreign policy
objectives. In practice, however, Canada in the World does not always inform the activities of DFAIT,
CIDA, or other departments.
Chapter IV of the foreign policy statement was written with CIDA. It identifies development coop-
eration as a key instrument of foreign policy that serves national objectives of prosperity, stability,
and security. The Canadian government pledges to support sustainable development as a means to
reduce poverty by focusing ODA on six priority areas:
1. Basic human needs;
2. Women in development;
3. Infrastructure services;
4. Human rights, democracy, and good governance;




But it is not clear that these six goals sit comfortably with Canada’s national interests as defined in
Canada in the World. The associated tensions lie at the heart of the policy coherence debate between
CIDA and DFAIT. They have also created some confusion for other government departments
(OGDs) attempting to operate internationally, whether independently, with CIDA, with DFAIT, or
with both. From 1995, the creation of a Global and Human Issues Division in DFAIT, and then
DFAIT’s adoption and active promotion of a human security agenda further exacerbated tensions.
Government institutional structures
The Canadian parliamentary system is based on the Westminster model. Executive power rests in
the hands of Cabinet whose members also sit as part of the legislative branch in Parliament. There
are currently no formal structures requiring any aspect of foreign policy to be coordinated with other
government departments’ policies. From a formal point of view, the best prospects for policy coher-
ence reside in the role of the central institutions of the government:
• Prime Minister’s Office (PMO);
• Privy Council Office (PCO);
• Minister’s Office; and
• Cabinet.
Whether decision-making is centralized, decentralized, or collective depends on the leadership style
of the prime minister. In recent years, the role of the prime minister has acquired importance due to
the blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign policy. Given the emphasis placed on
employment and growth domestically and the outward orientation of Canada, there has been an
increase in prime ministerial involvement in foreign and trade policy. 
The PMO possesses staff and research resources unavailable to ministers’ offices. The appointed
nature of its members ensures that the prime minister’s policy orientations will be followed when the
staff selects the files to be brought to his attention.89 According to Donald J. Savoie, the formal
autonomy of the ministers of development or foreign affairs is not sufficient to press a foreign issue
successfully. The prime minister’s intervention can be essential as illustrated in the 1997 success of
the international anti-personnel landmines ban.90
The PCO reports directly to the prime minister and is headed by a clerk, who is also secretary to the
Cabinet. PCO is both a Cabinet secretariat and the prime minister’s source of public service advice
across the entire spectrum of policy questions and operational issues facing the government. PCO
can play a role in coordination because it is a focal point for gathering and processing information
into overall government policy.91 Along with the PMO, PCO is the second stream of information to
the person of the prime minister. But its limited capacity and relatively small team prevent PCO
from effectively performing this task across all government departments. Unless development coop-
eration is a major priority of the prime minister and his/her office, policy coherence is unlikely to
receive much attention from PCO.
A minister’s office typically enjoys autonomy in fulfilling the mandate of the department. Ministers
are chosen by the prime minister on the basis of the orientation they are likely to follow during their
mandate. Coherence can be achieved at the ministerial level if ministers coordinate their respective
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departmental policies with one another or in Cabinet meetings, taking into consideration the man-
date of other departments. In the absence of PCO’s active initiative to coordinate all departments, it
is up to each department to inform others of its international policies and activities.
From a structural point of view, it is necessary to raise the issue of policy coherence and poverty
reduction at the political level. The involvement of the political centre in an issue can provide an
impetus for other levels to establish coordination practices that aim at policy coherence. A number of
officials interviewed at the director and director-general levels suggested that issues of coherence be
brought to the attention of the minister for maximum effect. The same recommendation could apply
to the prime minister (via the PMO and/or PCO), though time constraints limit the number of such
issues s/he may address.
Canadian literature perspectives
Current analyses on the role of development assistance in Canadian foreign policy centre primarily
on the relationship between CIDA and DFAIT, and the declining ODA budget. The works of aca-
demics Cranford Pratt, of the University of Toronto, and David Morrison, of Trent University, make
up the core of these analyses. 
CIDA-DFAIT relations
Debates about who should be the lead in ODA policy-making are shaped by the original intent
underlying the creation of CIDA. According to Cranford Pratt, CIDA’s first president, Maurice
Strong, “did not want CIDA to be a public corporation, or a separate ministry, or a branch within
what was then the Department of External Affairs (DEA).”92 Instead CIDA was created as an agency
of the DEA whose president had the status of under-secretary of state responsible to the Secretary of
State for External Affairs. This framework determined the extent of policy coherence by creating a
necessary link between aid and other foreign policy concerns under DEA responsibility.
Furthermore, the under-secretary rank of the CIDA president meant that her/his administrative
decisions could not be overruled by DEA officials. As well, once approved by the secretary of state,
decisions of the CIDA president were unlikely to be overturned by Cabinet. There was a de facto
recognition of the autonomy of the secretary of state and her/his department. With the proliferation
of international activities on the part of OGDs, however, the autonomy of departments can become a
source of incoherence.
For years, CIDA was not formally a part of any interdepartmental committee. CIDA’s contribution
to policy took place in ad hoc meetings with the DEA.93 Within the structure CIDA had operational
autonomy but responsibility for policy coherence rested in DEA because the Secretary of State could
in theory verify that CIDA’s activities were coherent with the broader foreign policy.
In spite of formal subordination, CIDA was able to expand its policy and operational autonomy by
bureaucratic means. Gains were limited and temporary and no changes were made to the institu-
tional framework to specify how CIDA and DFAIT must relate. In the 1980s, CIDA was described
by one of its presidents as a policy-taker rather than a policy-maker.94
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In 1989, new CIDA president Marcel Massé proposed to make the agency into a “powerful policy-
making and implementing body, responsible to the Secretary of State, operating within boundaries
broadly set by the government, sensitive to political and foreign policy objectives that were impor-
tant to the government but largely free of detailed overview by External Affairs.”95 The aim was to
take “a more ‘horizontal’ approach by working to influence government policies.”96 But the plan was
also controversial because it sought to move CIDA away from project-based activities toward policy
in line with structural adjustment programs of the IMF and the World Bank.97
When Canada in the World was published in 1995, ODA was subordinated to the three foreign policy
objectives that made prosperity, security and promotion of Canadian culture and values the main
themes of the foreign policy statement. The creation of the Global and Human Issues Bureau in
DFAIT in 1995 expanded the scope of the department’s action, creating overlaps with CIDA’s devel-
opment mandate. A joint CIDA-DFAIT committee chaired by the deputy minister of foreign affairs
was created to oversee the systematic policy coordination of the two departments to guarantee the
greatest possible coherence and synergy.98
The introduction of the concept of human security shortly after the publication of Canada in the
World raised the profile of policy coherence. Policy coherence was made necessary by the broadening
of the range of issues with which foreign and development cooperation policy were now concerned.
In Canada in the World, security was defined in more traditional ways. National security was seen to
be dependent on a politically and economically stable international order.99
Elements of human security can be found in Chapter VI of Canada in the World on the role of inter-
national assistance in the form of four of the six priorities of Canadian ODA. With the broadening of
the definition of security and threats to it, both ODA and foreign affairs began to intersect with the
activities of more government actors than was previously the case.
Whereas the international activities of OGDs had been considered separate, they now became cru-
cial because of their impact on poverty reduction, human security and coherence. Indeed, the 1990s
have seen an exponential expansion of OGDs’ international activities and a blurring of the domes-
tic/foreign policy divide. Instead of responding to crises in an ad hoc manner, the government began
to seek coherent approaches that relied on the know-how of all departments.100
Declining ODA funding
Like many other countries, Canada faced fiscal difficulties in the 1980s and 1990s. In an attempt to
resolve them and downsize the public sector, the Canadian government made budget cuts across
most government departments. These cuts particularly affected ODA (nearly 40 per cent of CIDA’s
budget). Together, the broadening of the foreign affairs agenda and the cuts created additional obsta-
cles to policy coherence in the form of inadequate personnel and financial resources, whilst at the
same time making it all the more urgent. Several programs were cut drastically in fiscal year
1996/97: targeted multilateral technical aid (10 per cent), food aid (23 per cent), geographical
branches (17 per cent), industrial cooperation (10 per cent), voluntary sector (21 per cent), interna-
tional NGOs (52 per cent), domestic NGOs (15 per cent), and Canadian public education NGOs
(100 per cent). The Public Participation Program was abolished.
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The fact that some areas of ODA were more seriously affected by budget cuts than others suggests
that the downsizing process was used to make policy.101 Budget cuts did not affect only programs and
projects. At the administrative level budgets cuts meant fewer resources available to carry out coher-
ence-related tasks, though not all methods for coordinating policies required additional personnel
and financial resources.
Interviews
The interviews conducted during this study revealed that coordination takes place through formal
and informal contacts. With respect to ODA, the main actors are CIDA and DFAIT with an increase
in the relevance of OGDs in the last few years. OGDs have developed ties with foreign and develop-
ing countries and they have engaged in more activities with them than has ever been the case.
This sub-section deals with the relations between CIDA, DFAIT, and OGDs as seen from the per-
spective of those involved. It follows the internal and external dimensions of coherence identified in
Section 2. It identifies sources of friction (mandates and funding), coordination mechanisms in use,
and some suggestions made by the interviewees. 
Internal coherence
In the context of Canadian ODA, internal coherence has three dimensions: 
• The coherence of CIDA’s activities;
• CIDA’s mandate to represent developing countries’ interests vs. domestic pressures to repre-
sent Canadian interests; and
• Programs and projects required vs. lack of funding (budget cuts).
Coherence of CIDA activities
Most comments on the lack of coherence of CIDA’s activities were from interviewees in DFAIT or
OGDs. A number of respondents questioned whether some CIDA branches’ operations were coher-
ent with the overall mission of the agency, but this was not a widely held view. Of particular concern,
in this respect, was the fact that CIDA’s many programs in a wide range of countries were not con-
ducive to coherent policy.
There are several lines along which policy may be incoherent. First, the fact that there exist geo-
graphical desks in CIDA appears incoherent for someone looking at policy from an issue-based per-
spective. Departments like DFAIT and Environment Canada, for example, operate on the basis of
issues like anti-personnel landmines or climate change and adopt the same approach with partner
countries. 
While CIDA has a central Policy Branch, the geographical desks play an important role in develop-
ing policy on the basis of regional or local conditions. The Country Programming Frameworks and
Regional Programming Frameworks serve as bases for policy in a particular area. By contrast, the
intervention of other departments in the same area would follow the blueprint used in other coun-
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tries or regions. But even for CIDA staff Country and Regional Programming Frameworks may
sometimes prove too rigid because they cannot cover all of the Agency’s activities in a country or
region.102
One interviewee used the image of “internal stovepipes” to illustrate the relationship between the
activities of the multilateral, geographical, and policy branches.103 In responding to recipients’ needs,
CIDA devises policies that may be incoherent. But another person at CIDA told us that the geo-
graphic orientation of the Agency is a misperception because not all parts are in fact geographically
organized. In the Partnership, Multilateral, and Policy Branches, CIDA functions by theme.104
One person suggested that when CIDA developed policy as a single entity, it was according to the
“slowest” common denominator because of the diversity of perspectives (geographical, multilateral,
policy) that had to be considered in a context of collegiality.105
There were concerns about a fundamental value of CIDA’s policies and programs: ownership.
According to that view, CIDA had become a demand-driven agency committed to ownership by the
aid recipients. CIDA wanted to move away from a top-down approach to policy-making and pro-
gramming. To make its policies coherent the world over or within a given country, it would have had
to refuse requests formulated by the recipients. 
For instance, the geographical desks could draw up a policy that may be appropriate for one country
or region but not for another. In addition, requests for aid on the part of a recipient could contradict
CIDA’s focus on a cross-cutting theme that it normally ought to have considered in all its program-
ming. For example, one interviewee asked: “How do you decide between a nuclear plant and a coal-
fired plant when a recipient needs energy?” One allows it to address a key concern of the govern-
ment (climate change) while the other provides energy more cheaply if that is what the recipient
requests. 
Domestic pressures
As a government agency CIDA is subject to the same domestic pressures as the rest of government.
From the beginning, CIDA officials have seen their task as one to represent the interests of develop-
ing countries to Canadians and their government. Changing domestic circumstances mean a chang-
ing environment for CIDA to navigate. Pressures emanate both from the NGO community and the
private sector in search of commercial opportunity. In addition, there are expectations on the part of
the Canadian public that government should serve Canadian interests.106 CIDA is often in a situation
where trade-offs have to be considered.107
The most consistent complaint about domestic pressures revolved around the private sector. The
linkages between the private sector and development have been addressed in the context of aid tying.
The OECD has pushed for the elimination of aid tying because it can be used as a way to promote
exports of national products when an open bidding process for procurement for a project may result
in a better cost-benefit ratio. While the principle of eliminating aid tying is well-established, the
Canadian private sector turns to CIDA for help in breaking into developing country markets. As one
CIDA official put it: “There is a perception that CIDA is here to aid and abet Canadian industry to
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get jobs.” In his view, the Agency seemed to be too closely involved with certain influential Canadian
companies.108
One of CIDA’s axes of development was the promotion of the private sector in developing countries
through direct assistance to private sector companies and the facilitation of an enabling
environment.109 However, the Canadian private sector saw private sector development as a mecha-
nism for developing the Canadian market.110 In some regions, CIDA’s programming was more about
assisting developing countries to create a free market domestically and integrate into the world mar-
ket than about aid. In Africa, for example, Canadian companies turned to CIDA because the Export
Development Corporation (EDC, now known as Export Development Canada) was underrepre-
sented (with only one agent at the time) and Canadian banks would not finance exports.111
The possibility that developing countries eligible for CIDA programs might become future trading
partners was a view that some CIDA officials shared.112 It became more transparent when a CIDA
interviewee suggested that Canada work with “sunrise” rather than “sunset” industries. In his view,
CIDA ought not to be used to promote ailing Canadian industries, but the promotion of “rising”
industries did not seem problematic. He nevertheless suggested that if the private sector were to be
used to achieve poverty reduction, questions would need to be asked about how to do it and what
tools were necessary. 
Further questions were raised about how CIDA as a whole related to the CIDA Industrial
Cooperation program (CIDA INC). One interviewee questioned the presence of CIDA INC within
the Agency on the grounds that its mission was very similar to that of the EDC. Although CIDA was
supposed to maintain a development focus in Canadian exports to developing countries, CIDA INC
faced additional pressures. As a result, the development mandate could be lost when CIDA became a
promoter of Canadian industry. One contributing factor may have been that CIDA INC personnel
was essentially composed of trade officers not necessarily familiar with the conditions of the coun-
tries in which they promoted Canadian business. As a result it was possible that a technology might
be promoted which was inappropriate for a given country. Without oversight from either the corre-
sponding geographical desk or Policy Branch, coherence could not be monitored.
What was lacking in CIDA and the Canadian government as a whole was a mechanism for dealing
with business pressures specifically. One interviewee suggested that the criticisms about CIDA’s too-
close-for-comfort relations with the private sector were exaggerated but that there was a need for
safeguards against influences that conflict with CIDA’s development mandate. Such a mechanism
should exist outside of CIDA so as to cover the entire range of government policy.113
CIDA’s role of educator and transmitter of developing countries’ views to Canada was met by resist-
ance and appeared to have been constrained by domestic interests. In at least a few cases, Canadian
companies had come to CIDA for ways to minimize the “social liabilities” of their projects rather
than for direct promotion.114 
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Lack of funding 
A constant source of frustration for CIDA was the lack of funds available given the extensive involve-
ment of the Agency around the world. Funding was a major problem that lay beyond the reach of
CIDA officials. It was problematic for CIDA’s own internal functioning and its relations with other
departments. The discrepancy between the goals stated and the sums allotted was another aspect of
internal coherence. 
In the second half of the 1990s, many programs that might have had a prior raison d’être were
reduced or eliminated, resulting in a negative effect on the goal of poverty reduction. In terms of
needs, there was still a justification for CIDA involvement. Moreover, there was a concern that in
light of cuts to its budget, CIDA might have been spreading itself too thin by trying to remain active
in the same range of countries.115 While other donors focused on a few countries only in which they
were very involved, CIDA’s range of countries eligible to receive Canadian ODA remained quite
broad. The overall coherence of CIDA policies was negatively affected by its having to respond to
requests made by widely different countries even if each intervention was in itself beneficial.  
External coherence
The results of interviews conducted with government officials in a variety of departments centred
primarily on three issues:
• Mandates;
• Resources, especially funding; and
• Coordination mechanisms.
External coherence was looked at from these three perspectives. The tensions that existed between
departments and agencies might have derived from differing mandates or, when there was mandate
compatibility, from differences in access to resources for program and projects. Finally, coordination
mechanisms currently in use were both formal and informal, with a predominance of the informal
type.
The interviews revealed contradictory aspects of relations between CIDA, DFAIT, and OGDs.
There were real tensions and frustrations expressed by officials in different departments concerning
their interaction with CIDA. Generally, however, there was an awareness of the different mandates
of government departments, including the domestic versus foreign orientations of those mandates.
Other sources of tensions raised were access to programming money, turf wars, and personality con-
flict (at the bureaucratic and political levels). 
Mandates
The policies of key departments in principle followed the departmental mandates outlined in Annex
Table 4.1. There has been an increasing focus on international activities, many of them involving
developing countries, as a way of fulfilling domestic mandates. The introduction of sustainable
development strategies in nearly all departments has also encouraged more international engage-
ment.116
When it comes to Canada’s relations with foreign countries, one of our interviewees in DFAIT said
that DFAIT was a department with several bosses:117
• Foreign Affairs minister;
• International Trade minister;
• International Cooperation minister;
• Secretary of State for la Francophonie;
• Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific; and
• Secretary of State for Africa and Latin America.
This list indicates the nature of DFAIT as the umbrella organization. However, there remains room
for both internal and external coherence. Internally, the mandates of Foreign Affairs and that of
International Trade may occasionally clash but the existence of a single department has allowed for a
better integration of the two mandates with minimal contradiction118 while differences between sec-
retaries of state can be adjudicated by ministers. 
The most direct criticism of the lack of coherence between foreign policy and Canadian develop-
ment cooperation came from one DFAIT official who stated that “CIDA is not the foreign ministry
for relations with developing countries”.119 In his view the current relationship between CIDA and
DFAIT did not conform to the Foreign Affairs Act or the foreign policy statement of the
Government of Canada, Canada in the World. Despite the 1994 foreign policy review making devel-
opment assistance an instrument of foreign policy, in practice DFAIT had not been given the lead in
determining policy vis-à-vis developing countries. In his view, foreign policy should have been the
primary concern even when dealing with developing countries, although most interaction might take
place over aid-related issues. Similarly, where commercial and trade relations predominated, the
Foreign Affairs part of the department remained in charge.
Tensions did not always indicate a lack of understanding of the respective mandates. Indeed, most
interviewees were quick to point out that mandates governing their department’s activities differed
from those of others, including CIDA. It was clear that the mandates governing CIDA and DFAIT
were different and that the lack of an enforced overarching mandate and attendant policy was partly
the cause of friction.120 One of the solutions suggested to the problem of the conflicting mandate was
to give DFAIT exclusive responsibility for policy-making toward all countries and to convert CIDA
into an implementing agency.121 What remained unclear was whether there was in DFAIT a genuine
understanding of the current mandate of CIDA, namely to promote poverty reduction in developing
countries.
The key factor identified as the cause of tension between CIDA and DFAIT was the foreign con-
stituency of the Agency versus the domestic constituency of DFAIT and OGDs. The enduring per-
ception in CIDA was that the Agency must represent the interests of developing countries to the
Canadian government and the Canadian public. Furthermore, CIDA’s activities had gone from sup-
ply-driven to demand-driven aid. This implied responsiveness to countries whose requests might not
meet DFAIT’s criteria of Canadian national interests. 
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For one such interviewee tension followed to a large extent from the different mandates governing
the Agency and the Department.122 The difficulty in meshing the two mandates leads to a de facto
autonomy of CIDA. 
Another solution proposed was to merge CIDA and DFAIT. There was a sense that a single
Department for Foreign Affairs and International Trade had worked well. The inclusion of ODA
policy in DFAIT would aim for the same result. The rationale for this move was that no formal
interdepartmental structure or outside intervention from the centre (PMO or PCO) would be neces-
sary to achieve policy coherence.123 What was currently a problem of CIDA-DFAIT external coher-
ence would become a matter of internal coherence. Policy-making on foreign relations, trade, and
development cooperation would take place horizontally and within a single department.
With two distinct institutions and the absence of subordination of CIDA to DFAIT, the mandate of
any department must be checked against CIDA’s if the Agency is to provide funding. Before CIDA
accepts to release the funds requested, it ensures that the projected activities meet the developmental
requirements of the Agency. A merger of the two institutions or the division of tasks between policy
and implementation would have to rest on the recognition of the specific development needs of
developing countries. Support for this move is unlikely on the part of development advocates in
Canada and in developing countries unless DFAIT can demonstrate its understanding of the situa-
tion and represent the interests of recipients.124
Another DFAIT respondent offered a different solution which he felt respected the mandates of
CIDA and DFAIT. Rather than a merger, it was suggested that each institution receive funding that
would allow it to pursue its own mandate without outside interference.125 Many interactions between
CIDA and other departments occurred so that the latter could fund the programs and projects
devised in light of their own mandates and policies. 
To avoid programs at cross-purposes it was further suggested that a clear set of guidelines be pro-
vided to DFAIT so that actions undertaken would not undermine CIDA’s efforts toward poverty
reduction. A coherent set of instructions, together with funding, would allow the mandates to be
implemented in parallel when possible and to cohere when one department’s mandate had a potential
impact on another’s.
The fear remained great on the part of CIDA and development advocates that development coopera-
tion policy risked being made to serve domestic interests. Yet some in DFAIT felt that occasionally
their own mandate was subject to interference from the outside, rather than DFAIT taking over
other departments’ mandates.126
The interviewee who expressed this worry also noted that he considered CIDA part of the foreign
policy establishment. As a rule, he was reluctant to break with CIDA despite the differences that
might exist between their respective mandates. In his view, CIDA brought to Canadian foreign pol-
icy the development perspective that would otherwise be lacking, while DFAIT looked after its polit-
ical, trade, and strategic responsibilities. Unlike other respondents, he showed less concern about
CIDA’s de facto autonomy. He indicated that “some in DFAIT long for older days when CIDA used
to be at the beck and call of DFAIT” when the Agency’s activities furthered DFAIT’s mandate.
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With the shift from supply-driven to demand-driven aid, and the corresponding ownership of policy
by developing countries, it is all the more necessary to ensure that recipients’ interests be repre-
sented effectively within Canada. Poverty reduction must stem from recipients’ initiatives to which
CIDA lends support through the provision of goods and services. But DFAIT is not the only depart-
ment that must work with CIDA although this is the most sustained relationship with respect to
development cooperation. Other departments with a domestic mandate sometimes meet resistance
because their programs and projects do not fit the development criteria of CIDA.
The most high-profile institutions in this respect are the Department of Finance and Export
Development Canada. When prompted on the orientation of Finance and EDC, interviewees
pointed out that the goals and content of programming were largely domestic. While both were
extensively involved with multilateral agencies (primarily the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank) and with foreign countries, the objectives pursued were national.127 Finance looked
after the fiscal situation of Canada and EDC promoted Canadian exports and investments overseas.
Each mandate sought to maintain the Crown’s finances in order. EDC advised the Minister of
Finance on funding for specific projects related to Canadian exports. As an independent crown cor-
poration, EDC’s activities take place within parameters set by the Government of Canada to pro-
mote a positive balance of trade. EDC also has its own commercial interest in relations to developing
countries, that is, mainly to ensure that borrowers could reimburse EDC.
The Department of Finance also has a significant potential impact on development because of its
role in advising the government on tariffs. On the General Preferential Tariff, it is Canadian compa-
nies that ask Finance for changes to current tariffs. If, however, a developing country requests a
reduction of tariffs on its products, it must make that request through DFAIT. In so doing, the
request is subject to review by DFAIT based on DFAIT’s mandate and may be subject to political
consideration.128 Similarly, there is consultation with Industry Canada on how domestic producers
might be affected and there is CIDA input on how this might affect the developing countries. If
CIDA is unable to press development concerns, poverty reduction risks being marginalized as an
objective.
In a number of sectors, changes in the global trading regime can be used to support development in
developing countries. In the case of the agriculture, for example, low-income countries are seeking
the right under the WTO to introduce measures to protect small farmers from subsidized exports
from the EU and the US. This is considered important for reasons of poverty and food security. 
Another source we interviewed in the Department of Finance expressed clear apprehension that
CIDA’s mandate could interfere with that of EDC. While he said he would be glad to have CIDA as
a part of the peer review process for EDC projects, he would in turn request that EDC be involved
in CIDA’s activities “from a defensive point of view.”129 While recognizing the existence of “other
worlds” besides EDC’s, he expressed the view that policy coherence ought to take place at the devel-
opment end rather than at the commercial end. He stated that he did not “really know whether the
exports EDC promotes help developing countries; Finance is concerned with whether or not coun-
tries can pay back.”
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From Finance and EDC’s perspective it was not only CIDA’s mandate that can interfere.
Government-wide policies such as the Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) or Gender-Based
Analysis could lead to the rejection of projects that EDC would otherwise have supported. If poverty
reduction were part of EDC’s review process, this might in his view have had negative effects on the
Corporation’s mandate. He said he considered EDC as an independent government agency not sub-
ject to government policies. If EDC ought not to proceed with a project, the indications should have
emanated from DFAIT.130
In other circumstances, there were indications that the poverty reduction focus was acknowledged
more readily although the domestic aims of government departments could not be overlooked even
when dealing with developing countries. As one person at Environment Canada put it, “we can’t be
too naïve on aid — the reality is that we have national interests.”131 The issue might be more one of
balancing different mandates and making trade-offs. The question was: were all relevant actors pres-
ent around the table? Having access to other departments’ perspectives, including CIDA’s develop-
ment view, would allow for greater coherence in  Environment Canada’s activities. 
There was a sense outside CIDA that different government departments could not always reinforce
one another, otherwise there would be a superministry for foreign relations that would coordinate all
foreign activities of all departments.
When compared to the mandates of DFAIT and OGDs, CIDA’s mandate appeared unique. CIDA
was aware that different departments had different constituencies that expected actions which con-
tradicted those of other departments. One interviewee told us that “there is a perception in govern-
ment that CIDA is just another NGO” pressing its own set of issues.132 No matrix existed to define
the totality of Canada’s relations with developing countries; different government agents did differ-
ent things and mandates competed against one another without apparent awareness of how they
interacted and contradicted others’. 
Pressures were exerted directly on CIDA (see “Internal coherence” above) and through other depart-
ments. There needed to be someone who looked at development and poverty reduction. One policy-
maker in CIDA put the point concisely: “If we don’t look at policy coherence from a viewpoint of
development, then no one else will.”133 Another, particularly worried about the influence of non-aid
policies, stated that CIDA’s mandate was not open to negotiation.134 The development focus had to
be met for CIDA to lend its support.
Because of the commitment to represent the interests of developing countries, there were two
images that stuck (sic) to CIDA according to one of its employees: “First, CIDA is full of bleeding
hearts; and second, it is sitting on a big pot of money that it is unwilling to share. CIDA only cares
about non-Canadians.”135
In some cases, however, CIDA interviewees did not identify major contradictions between their
agency and the foreign affairs establishment. For instance, one respondent referred to Canada in the
World as the framework of reference to be followed. “We have our marching orders; the 1994 foreign
policy review provided a solid foundation for CIDA and articulated clear political indicators. CIDA
is given a mandate and priorities and it states that all government departments with an international
dimension must work together.”136
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Another person in charge of policy echoed Canada in the World by saying that “CIDA’s mandate is as
clear as it has ever been, even if it is not applied as well as it could be.”137 He warned that if the
Agency’s mandate, its priorities, and ODA generally were reopened, they might become subject to
more non-aid and non-poverty reduction pressures from society and other departments.
What the interviewee did not specify was how CIDA’s role as an instrument of foreign policy pro-
tected the Agency’s position. Strictly speaking, there was a formal subordination of ODA policy.
However, CIDA retained a programming capacity unavailable to other departments. We were also
told by another CIDA employee that some fears of having a diluted mandate were not necessarily
justified. He pointed out that Foreign Affairs was used to dealing with developing countries.
Moreover, in his opinion, Foreign Affairs was “somewhat progressive” whereas International Trade
had a narrow commercial and financial focus. But a department like DFAIT could emphasize the
role of developing countries in trade. It could respond to needs for technical assistance so that they
might “take advantage of the open trading system.”
This possibility led one person to say that aid was sometimes used to lubricate political relations with
developing countries. In this context, where there were few economic interests and limited trade,
politics predominated. Some countries benefited from Canadian ODA because of their political and
diplomatic importance.138 A similar problem was present in countries that had significant pockets of
poverty without being, strictly speaking, developing countries.139 This approach to ODA met the let-
ter of Canada in the World but risked subordinating poverty reduction efforts to Canada’s strategic
aims. 
More obviously, economic motives could also be identified in aspects of CIDA’s operations. The
existence of the CIDA Industrial Cooperation program (CIDA INC) supplements the role of EDC.
Because EDC is also a corporation which tries to operate commercially, it is relatively uninterested
in developing countries that do not constitute large markets or that cannot necessarily reimburse
loans. CIDA INC has been called upon to support Canadian exports and investments in developing
countries if these can be shown also to have good development prospects. It was also expected that
economic exchanges promoted by CIDA INC might lead to more sustained economic and trading
relations in the future.140
In Asia, for example, where CIDA’s role is more modest than in the past, it has followed more closely
the Canadian government’s foreign policy statement, that is, ODA has played a supportive role.
According to the person interviewed, mandates could co-exist. The debate should therefore be on
“complementarity” rather than on “coherence.” Rather than seeking to harmonize policies so that
they aimed directly at poverty reduction in the recipient country, it was considered more effective to
avoid working at cross-purposes.141
Where trade was concerned, one way to contribute to development and poverty reduction would
have been to open Canadian markets to developing countries’ products, thereby providing opportu-
nities (e.g., clothing from Bangladesh). However, CIDA INC’s mandate did not extend to other
aspects of trade, especially import policy. Lifting restrictions on certain imports — tariffs or other —
remained the responsibility of Finance and DFAIT, in consultation with sectoral departments like
Industry and Agriculture Canada.
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The relations between the Canadian private sector and CIDA require greater transparency.
According to one person interviewed, when CIDA INC gave a contract to a firm, it was unclear why
this firm had won over others. Helping Canadian businesses export to developing countries should
not have been about increasing Canadian exports of goods and services, but rather taking firms that
represented pro-development values and supporting them in the hope that they would contribute
both directly (through investment, job creation, etc.) and indirectly through a long-term sharing of
values and perspective, to CIDA’s objective of poverty reduction.142
One CIDA official suggested that CIDA staff need “to become ‘hyphenated aid people’. The devel-
opment mandate cannot be looked at in isolation from other mandates. We need to think in terms of
environment-and-development, security-and-development, etc.”143
With regard to overall foreign policy, the extension of DFAIT’s mandate since the mid-1990s elicited
worries in CIDA. The creation of the Global Affairs Division in Foreign Affairs was seen in CIDA as
an attempt to take over some of CIDA’s agenda although it could also serve as a basis for coordina-
tion.144 The broad-gauged approach of Global Affairs, together with the active promotion of the
human security agenda from 1996 onward, have created overlaps between DFAIT’s and CIDA’s man-
date. 
Yet there remained a major obstacle to coordination that would lead to poverty reduction. There was
strong resistance in DFAIT to the inclusion of economic issues into the concept of human security.
According to an official familiar with this file, the inclusion of economics would make it
meaningless.145 More important, perhaps, was the fact that a redefinition of human security with
development and poverty reduction in mind would go against the prevailing commercial and trade
policy of the Canadian government. It would require a radical rethinking of the current foreign pol-
icy framework, including a modified approach to liberalization, especially in developing countries.
Funding
The second common source of tension between CIDA and other departments was funding. One
characteristic of CIDA was that it was essentially a programming department as opposed to a policy
department with a formal legislative mandate.146 Most of its resources served to fund programming
(i.e., grants and contributions) rather than operating costs. By contrast, in other departments the
share of operational costs was much higher than the programming budget.147
As we have discussed previously, the international involvement of domestically oriented departments
is relatively recent and followed globalizing trends of the 1990s. One peculiar effect of the interna-
tionalization of government departments is that in addition to the traditional domestic programming
part of their activities, departments must now fund their activities in developing countries. 
The situation differs between DFAIT and OGDs. Foreign Affairs and International Trade has tradi-
tionally been involved internationally but to a lesser extent than is the case today. There has been a
significant expansion in the range of issues now addressed by the foreign affairs minister. For OGDs,
the change has been even more radical because of the traditional national focus of their activities and
policy responsibilities. 
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One person we interviewed at DFAIT suggested that the key problem in the relationship with CIDA
was that the Agency had the money while DFAIT had the information.148 In peacebuilding and
human security, for example, it was DFAIT that had the prime responsibility and the personnel. But
the policy-making capacity and the know-how were not matched with funds for programs and proj-
ects that would fulfil the human security agenda. According to him, CIDA ought to have expected
other departments and DFAIT in particular to turn to the Agency for resources to devote to such
issues where developing countries were concerned. 
Peacebuilding and human security are possibly the most illustrative cases because they lie at the
intersection of security and development. They are also points at which both tensions and synergies
between CIDA and DFAIT are most obvious. However, the real question is which has priority over
the other. To simplify, the perspective from DFAIT was that security was a precondition for other
types of activity — more specifically economic activity. From CIDA’s vantage point, the range of
issues that fall under security was wider. 
The definition of human security that informs policy and programming in DFAIT stands at odds
with CIDA’s own mandate which includes poverty reduction. At DFAIT, we were told that the defi-
nition of human security that guided Canadian foreign policy ought not to include development
issues. However, for CIDA to fund a project it had to meet poverty reduction and developmental cri-
teria that pertained to CIDA’s mandate. As the Minister of International Cooperation put it in 1999:
“To a very large extent, the human security agenda is the development agenda, even if we haven’t
always expressed it in those terms”.149 Human security and environment-related activities that
involved developing countries tended to lead to requests for CIDA funds but it was unclear who
should have been providing the resources. The Department of National Defence (DND) could even
have been considered as a source of funding in this respect.150
Such a divergence on the role of development in human security caused much squabbling over fund-
ing of DFAIT’s activities pertaining to its Human Security Agenda. CIDA evaluates projects on the
basis of their contribution to development and poverty reduction whereas DFAIT does not consider
development a criterion for judging the relevancy of a project. However, in the absence of its own
source of funding, DFAIT turns to CIDA for resources.
What appeared to be especially bothersome for CIDA was the sidelining of its development objec-
tives. One person at CIDA deplored that the Agency was seen as a “milk cow” to be used by other
departments when money was needed.151 Instead, he maintained, CIDA must be viewed as an agency
with ideas and policies to be implemented. He nevertheless recognized that CIDA staff were often
too negative toward outside requests for funding. Part of the problem, he suggested, was that poverty
reduction was interpreted too restrictively by CIDA and thus could not accommodate a variety of
means to achieve this end. Projects aimed at poverty reduction focus exclusively on the poor when in
reality there could have been other projects with beneficial poverty reduction effects.
In OGDs, there was a sense that CIDA was overtaxed by funding requests. At Environment Canada
we were told that “CIDA is at the receiving end of the integration problem; it is seen as sitting on
millions of dollars without being open to others.”152 The interviewee nevertheless pointed out that
this perception might not have been accurate. For instance, she noted the length of CIDA projects,
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which typically spanned several years and involved long-term commitments that could be upset by
requests for funding. For CIDA to accede to those requests could mean ending a project before com-
pletion.
Several interviewees at CIDA noted that “the need for coherence has increased at a time of declining
resources; as a result we need more coherence to ensure a ‘bigger bang for the buck’.”153 Efficient
use of money had its obvious merits. But there were consequences to this emphasis on effective use
of resources. One aspect concerned the key objectives of the Government of Canada as opposed to
merely those of CIDA. There was a clear emphasis on growth in domestic and foreign policy with
which CIDA’s mandate could be at odds. Scarce resources could be diverted from ODA to the pro-
motion of Canadian employment and prosperity (the prime objective of Canadian foreign policy) or
ODA could be effectively made to serve the three priorities of foreign policy with only passing
thought to the goal of poverty reduction. Because the mandates remained unchanged, because the
pool of resources was smaller, and because government priorities had been defined in terms of
domestic growth, tensions were bound to endure and even increase. This would be especially the
case if the government were to respect the letter of Canada in the World.
For one CIDA official “much of the battle between CIDA and DFAIT comes down to resources and
who controls them.”154 Some suggested that if resources were to be increased, relations between
CIDA and other departments might become more collegial155 because one important cause of con-
flict would disappear. In light of this, the solution seemed simple enough. At DFAIT, similar advice
was heard. Interaction with CIDA to obtain funding was sometimes considered to involve transac-
tion costs that could be avoided if all departments were given a programming budget for interna-
tional activities. This was a situation he believed all departments faced in relation to CIDA.156
Another official proposed that CIDA relinquish 25 per cent of its budget in favour of other depart-
ments so that they might proceed with the international dimension of their mandates.157 In the case
of his own division, he considered a budget of C$100 million desirable. CIDA would automatically
be less solicited for support and thus tensions would diminish. 
There was a further obstacle to programming in DFAIT. According to an interviewee active in
peacebuilding, there was no discretionary fund for issues regarded as “more political.” There were
also questions about CIDA’s willingness to take risks in investing in certain projects. Thus, CIDA
sometimes resisted releasing the funds until it received unfavourable press for the delays caused.158
One example of inconsistent CIDA behaviour according to DFAIT was CIDA’s refusal to fund sol-
diers sent to Kosovo although it did fund a police force in Haiti. The person interviewed could not
see what underlined these different decisions. In the case of Haiti, he said, CIDA could have just as
easily argued that the Solicitor General should fund it rather than the Agency.
Another DFAIT interviewee took a more empathetic stance by pointing to stricter CIDA auditing
criteria as a possible cause for the apparently risk-averse nature of the Agency. He explained the
reluctance of CIDA to get involved as resulting from the sometimes unclear and risky content of
DFAIT’s projects.159 The problems he encountered over funding were partly solved because money
was granted to DFAIT for peacebuilding purposes. Branches or divisions of DFAIT that had been
given a programming budget had comparatively fewer conflicts with CIDA.
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According to people in both CIDA and DFAIT, there could be advantages to DFAIT having its own
resources. The potential for collaboration would go beyond project administration with CIDA
money, and into co-funding. Collaboration could take place on an issue-by-issue basis. By the same
token, however, DFAIT could pursue its mandate alone if no agreement with CIDA could be found.
The possibilities associated with co-funding were appealing, but if departments did not reach an
agreement and opted for separate projects and no mechanisms were set up to ensure coherence, uni-
lateral action might undermine poverty reduction efforts undertaken by CIDA. 
Employees in DFAIT and OGDs were aware of this possibility to some degree. In Environment
Canada, we were told that policy-making responsibilities matched by a programming budget with a
clear management framework and a reporting system would solve much of the problem.160 At
DFAIT the suggestion was a budget with Development Assistance Committee guidelines to follow in
DFAIT’s own programming.161 In both cases, the solutions advocated were meant to avoid conflict
with CIDA while ensuring that development concerns would be included.162
Relations between CIDA and other departments appeared to vary depending on the length of those
departments’ international involvement. Departments newer to the international scene requested
more funds from CIDA for their activities. In parallel, they requested a ministerial platform for
international policy-making and the corresponding budget that would allow them to avoid CIDA
altogether. Although an “old” department, even DFAIT was lacking money and sought it at every
opportunity.163
At CIDA, the perception of DFAIT and OGDs was not always negative. Some interviewees noted a
certain amount of organizational learning elsewhere in government. For example, it appeared that
DFAIT had developed an understanding of the criteria according to which CIDA operated. “The
department”, one person said, “no longer tries to raid CIDA’s coffers; instead, DFAIT approaches
the Agency with pro-CIDA projects”.164 To ensure the development focus of projects undertaken by
OGDs in Latin America, the Americas Branch of CIDA had decided that “we had to teach them
about development if they wanted our money”.165 This was a response to the feeling that OGDs
would “come to CIDA for money and then tell it to go away.” Moreover, the development expertise
of CIDA and its long-standing knowledge of developing countries, in particular the pitfalls that
might be encountered, were recognized to provide added value to departments whose international
involvement was comparatively recent.
Coordination mechanisms
Coordination mechanisms used to keep different departments informed of respective policies and
programs followed two models: formal and informal. There was some disagreement among the
interviewees on the relative merits of one type or the other. However, there was a sense that purely
informal means of coordinating departmental actions were not sufficient. This sub-section first
addresses the formal mechanisms in place or suggested by participants. Then it turns to a brief dis-
cussion of the informal mechanisms our sources reported relying upon to coordinate actions.
A number of interviews raised the question of the now defunct Interdepartmental Committee on
External Relations with Developing Countries (ICERDC). The question we posed to interviewees
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was whether ICERDC was an effective mechanism for ensuring coherence of different departments’
policies toward developing countries. 
Responses were mixed. At CIDA we were told by a group of officials that ICERDC was key to plan-
ning Canada activities in the developing world. Since it had been abolished, there had been institu-
tional-related debates between several departments on ways to coordinate but an overall framework
was still lacking. Currently, we were told, “Ninety-five per cent of Cabinet’s attention is domestic
and CIDA is neither big nor powerful enough to command attention.”166 Development questions
could easily fall by the wayside. Yet, coordination at a broader and on a higher policy level could
benefit from the reinstatement of ICERDC or a similar committee bringing together senior execu-
tives from departments engaged internationally. Failing that, the Minister for International
Cooperation could be brought into the Cabinet’s Economic Committee. Ultimately however, the
weight given to international development issues depended on the importance given to developing
countries. To be effective, a Cabinet structure would require the internalization of the importance of
developing countries in government bodies other than CIDA, DFAIT, and Finance.
Another CIDA source who supported the idea of a forum at the political level cautioned against the
idea of having a Cabinet structure specific to developing countries.167 In his view there was a great
risk that poverty reduction might be marginalized. Instead he suggested that Cabinet give more
attention to international issues writ large. Discussions of development cooperation should be part of
the mainstream discussions. CIDA already participated in a fair number of interdepartmental com-
mittees and a Cabinet committee would add to this.
An added advantage to the creation of a Cabinet committee, according to an interviewee, would be
that senior bureaucrats from different departments would have to get involved with their respective
minister. At the same time, the importance of a political-level structure should not be overempha-
sized because much interaction takes place at lower levels. As far as political leadership goes, the cre-
ation of a parliamentary committee on international development would be even less useful because
of “the relative unimportance of Parliament in the Canadian political system”.168
At lower levels, coordination was sought by interdepartmental working groups and committees set
up by officials occupying positions from manager to assistant deputy minister (ADM). It was at this
point that the absence of a systematic framework required more willingness to coordinate on the part
of those who made policy and those who implemented it. Interdepartmental working groups and
committees might be considered semi-formal in that they implied agreed upon, sustained interaction
between government actors over an issue or set of issues. 
CIDA’s Gender Equality Division, for example, had been involved with 12 other departments by way
of interdepartmental groups since 1992.169 In Asia Branch, interdepartmental groups had been set
up and interdepartmental cooperation had taken place at the project level.170 CIDA INC, which is
more concerned with trade, was involved in 14 different sectoral trade groups in addition to one on
health matters.171 One advantage of semi-formal structures like interdepartmental committees is that
they force participants to compromise.172
A variation on the theme consisted in striking agreements in principle or memoranda of understand-
ing (MOUs) with other departments to hold annual meetings of management groups to discuss
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respective policies or programming. At these annual events views could be exchanged and agreement
reached on priorities; ADMs and directors of policy often attended. 
To follow up on annual meetings, each department sent one of its members to sit on the others’
weekly management committee meeting. This practice appeared to be more common between
CIDA and DFAIT than with OGDs. But one person at CIDA said that he included OGDs when
activities went beyond commercial and development funding.173 A senior official at DFAIT proposed
a joint DFAIT-CIDA annual foreign policy review that would allow a range of common interests and
concerns to be addressed.174 He said such a process used to exist but ended with the 1994 foreign
policy review that produced Canada in the World. 
The downside of such an exercise was that it might compromise ministerial prerogatives and thus be
resisted. In addition, the joint review would make sense only if there could be a reasonable expecta-
tion that both parties would be able to get a fair hearing from the other. For the period 1996-99,
CIDA tended to lose in ministerial head-to-heads when disagreements arose.175
In some cases, this type of sustained interaction had given rise to shared agendas. There were a few
instances of shared agenda that had served to formalize relations between different departments.176
It was important to look at overlaps between different departments while remaining aware of the
potential for co-optation. CIDA’s Asia Branch and DFAIT had developed a shared agenda over time.
Asia had been a key area for collaboration and government departments had to work with one
another. There were strong imperatives over ten years ago on CIDA to build bridges with DFAIT so
that Asia branches in CIDA and in DFAIT had made efforts to get together around common objec-
tives. They developed a “culture of collaboration” and tried to articulate a shared agenda, to under-
stand Asian reality together, to understand Canadian positions and priorities in the region. The
China Programming Framework played a key role in coordinating departmental actions in that
country and a mutually agreed comprehensive development framework was developed.177
The work was undertaken in a way that respected the departments’ mandates. Other imperatives
such as ASEAN and APEC forced a broadening of participation to include Status of Women,
Industry Canada, and Environment Canada. Interdepartmental collaboration occurred because other
departments’ participation added to CIDA’s own development results. At the project level, interde-
partmental groups had taken care of coordination. The overall importance of Asia in Canada’s gov-
ernment was also a contributing factor in this apparent success, but the effectiveness of coordination
had been concentrated in the CIDA-DFAIT relationship and remains less with OGDs, according to
a CIDA interviewee.
Similarly, the work undertaken interdepartmentally on climate change spilled over into a Climate
Change Secretariat. In this case, the cause of success was a systematic framework to deal with hori-
zontal issues and force actors to come together and reach agreement. Weekly meetings were held by
ADMs despite the differences that existed between the departments. Problems were dealt with by
working groups through daily contacts prior to producing a policy document. The practice of circu-
lating a concept paper or similar document for comments was judged inadequate to address coher-
ence concerns. On the climate change file, it was at the political level — as opposed to the bureau-
cratic level — that synergy was lacking.
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The one case where a systematic approach was adopted at the outset was Haiti. The mechanism used
in Haiti was close to a unique structure. There was a special coordinator who operated across the
government and chaired an ongoing interdepartmental taskforce on that country. As coordinator, his
role was to bring together as many government policies and activities as possible with regard to Haiti
from desk officer to assistant deputy minister levels to foster a maximum of coherence. 
Cooperation was kept especially close for geographic desks in DFAIT and CIDA so that there was a
de facto task force. Desk officers and resources from different departments were assigned coordi-
nated tasks. Following this, it was possible to move up notches in level and intensity. Initial openness
became cooperation over time. The taskforce on Haiti was an operational one as well as a coordina-
tion mechanism at the planning stage. For this there needed to be resource input — a question that
came up elsewhere as a problem. There also needed to be a coordinating position and senior bureau-
cratic involvement. In the case of Haiti there was clear prime ministerial interest.
The Haiti file reportedly worked well, in part due to the mechanism. Information-sharing was sys-
tematic because of it, in contrast to other coordination mechanisms whose details had not been
determined in advance. Before action was undertaken, the government actors involved in Haiti
worked out the conflicts. With other donors, the coordinator laid out ideas ahead of time. This was
particularly true with the US which could block decisions if it disagreed. Relations with other donors
were also managed through the “Friends of Haiti” (France, US, Canada, Chile, Argentina,
Venezuela, and the UN), and the UNDP in Port-au-Prince.
Because of imperatives faced by each department, policies might be difficult to coordinate or render
fully coherent. Emphasizing the operational side of government activities, one interviewee at
Environment Canada told us that simply “knowing what’s going on — never mind the policies —
would be of great help.” Coherence in policy should not be pursued for its own sake, unless it could
give rise to successful government-wide policies, such as the Sustainable Development Strategy. 
Information-sharing on projects between different departments could suffice to avoid some incoher-
ent actions. The rationale behind systematic information exchange was that each department would
be able to identify other departments’ projects that might undermine its own, or vice-versa, and
advise the departments in question. For this method to be effective, it was necessary for CIDA and
other departments to volunteer information on their own projects. Our interviewee voiced the
impression that CIDA’s outreach in the capital was not as high and effective as it should have been:
“No one knows if CIDA is pushing a broad agenda” or if it was operating separately from other
departments. In the absence of information sharing, neither CIDA nor other departments knew what
the others were doing, which was likely to lead to incoherence.178
One CIDA official posted in a key international financial institution told us that “I’m only as good as
the information I get… I don’t want to walk blind.”179 To do her work well, she required informa-
tion from as many sources as possible. At the same time, there had been complaints about the rele-
vancy of information provided. One person in the Department of Finance reported that CIDA
sometimes sent too detailed information concerning its projects when only aggregate numbers — for
the purpose of reporting — would have sufficed. This was also addressed by the above CIDA official
who said she volunteered information only when it was relevant. 
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At both CIDA and DFAIT we were told that effective transmission of information required an
understanding of everyone’s vested interests. According to one source it was possible for one person
to represent another’s interests without sharing them. A smooth flow of relevant information could
address some coherence problems and allow actors to determine whether to contact one another
directly or meet to discuss further the problems at hand. A CIDA interviewee said that “a culture of
cooperation implies respecting another’s needs and positions, validation, and knowing what the oth-
ers are doing.”180 Information-sharing also took place by way of comments requested on projects. In
the Americas Branch of CIDA, projects were submitted to other departments for feedback. Here
multiple actors were involved and there were often several themes (political, trade, development) and
different levels of government (federal, provincial, municipal) and different sectors (public, private,
community) represented. 
Exchange at lower echelons was not a substitute for upper-echelon involvement however.181 While it
laid the groundwork for more formal coordination, ADM, vice-president, and director-general
involvement added effectiveness because of the status of the position and because they were the peo-
ple with a bird’s eye view of what was being done in their department. Depending on the issue con-
sidered, a semi-formal mechanism might be created. 
Ultimately, “the real test is to make sure the minister knows”, someone said at CIDA. It was some-
times necessary to bypass “information censorship” and provide leadership for an issue to make it to
the minister’s desk. When an issue needed to be pushed, the interviewee said she opted to speak
directly to the specific ADM or DM at Finance or DFAIT, or to the vice-president at CIDA. When a
compromise needed to be worked out with other departments, she sought ministerial guidance to
avoid longer-term bureaucratic processes. Contact with the upper levels was not a panacea however;
in the long-run it was the quality and relevancy of the information which mattered most. It was nec-
essary to know the others’ priorities and determine what information they needed.
Finally, knowledge, rather than information, sometimes provided an avenue to avoid incoherence in
the first place and coordination after the fact — that is, after a project had been drawn up.
Interviewees in several departments told us that they purposefully hired employees with a develop-
ment background so that they might contribute that perspective to the programming of the depart-
ment. On other occasions, employees of one department were seconded to other departments or to
multilateral organizations. The knowledge base specific to each department could be shared with
others. In the case of gender analysis, for example, the Department of Justice called on CIDA for a
list of consultants specializing on gender.
Aspects of coherence and country studies
The three developing country studies that form part of this project on Poverty and Policy Coherence
provide more concrete illustrations of some of the problems inherent in the conduct of ODA as part
of a broader foreign policy, or concurrently to the efforts of OGDs in fulfilment of their respective
mandate. All potential problems we discovered in interviews with officials in Ottawa headquarters
were fortunately not present in each country where Canadian government departments and agencies
were active. What follows is a brief overview of some differences and similarities in sources of inco-
herence in Bangladesh, Jamaica, and Mali.
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Internal coherence: The first possible source of internal incoherence pertained to cross-cutting issues
CIDA has to address in its programming. In the Jamaica study, the authors found  internal coherence
sometimes lacking in the fields of gender and social issues. The study reported that although CIDA
projects were in principle subject to guidelines on gender and social impact, the lack of monitoring
meant that some projects went ahead without due consideration given to these issues. As a result,
some cases of non-compliance were found.
The case studies introduced another dimension of internal coherence in the form of the relations
between different parts of CIDA and in the form of headquarters-field relations. In the Bangladesh
country study, doubts were expressed about consultations of field officers when designing policy. The
authors referred to an institutional hierarchy that “plays a key role in designing and implementing
policies and programs.”182 Policy was decided at CIDA headquarters with comments and input from
the field offices not always heeded by policy-makers.
External coherence: With respect to external coherence, the bulk of interactions and interdepartmental
contacts took place between CIDA and DFAIT, with CIDA-OGD relations remaining at a minimum
level in Jamaica and Mali. This mirrored the situation we identified in the Ottawa-based study.
However, in contrast to the situation at headquarters, the embassy in Bamako and the High
Commissions in Dhaka and Kingston played a greater role in coordinating actions in the field. 
The tensions revealed in the Ottawa interviews were not raised in the interviews conducted in the
recipient countries. This might have reflected the fact that there were fewer actors on the ground
than at headquarters and that since policy was determined in Canada, there were fewer opportunities
for conflict in the recipient countries. In the field, cooperation was close and the centre (embassy or
High Commission) could act as broker in a way the PMO and PCO do not in Canada due to the
many other concerns they must address.
One other element that might have mitigated conflicts is the relative importance of the country in
political, commercial, and development terms. For instance, in Mali, trade was comparatively less
important than in Jamaica and Bangladesh, and hence there were few pressures for ODA to support
Canadian objectives of prosperity and job creation in Canada. In contrast, in Jamaica, commercial
ties were stronger and hence there were more possible sources of conflict between pursuing
Canadian interests and targeting poverty through ODA. 
In the case of Bangladesh, one area of incoherence was Canada’s support of the Multi-Fibre
Arrangement (MFA) due to expire in 2005 and the maintenance of high tariffs on labour-intensive
products like clothing. Because Bangladesh has a considerable clothing industry, these policies con-
stituted an obstacle to its development. This issue was resolved with the announcement in June 2002
of the removal of all tariffs and quotas on all imports (except poultry, eggs, and dairy products) from
all least-developed countries as of January 2003. But there are other ways in which trade policy can
be used to support poverty reduction efforts. As already mentioned, developing countries may need
safeguards against subsidized agricultural imports from developed countries. Another critical area
has been the protection of intellectual property rights — and whether the WTO rules allow people
in developing countries to access the medicines and other technologies needed for their health and
development. The Canadian government has usually favoured trade liberalization and the imple-
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mentation of WTO rules by all developing countries, rather than changing the rules to meet devel-
oping countries’ particular needs, even if this may impose costs or undermine poverty reduction
efforts.183
A further area of incoherence concerned Canada’s tacit support of the Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAPs) of the international financial institutions (IFIs). In Jamaica, the authors noted that
since the country had to implement SAPs, the conditions of the poor had deteriorated. Yet the
Canadian Department of Finance, which represents Canada in the IFIs, accepted SAPs in their cur-
rent form, while some of CIDA’s programming aimed to mitigate the now recognized negative
impacts of SAPs on the poor. This constituted a clear case of external incoherence between Finance
and CIDA. It also became a case of internal incoherence when CIDA itself participated in condition-
ality and withheld funding for projects pending reforms in the recipient country.
Coordination mechanisms with a view to coherence found in the country studies were largely semi-
formal and informal. In Jamaica, committees, roundtables, and phone calls were used. Committees
by definition implied membership, scheduling, and preparation while phone calls could be made
informally and on an as-needed basis. Similarly, the preparation of the Country Program Framework
implied consultations with other departments and stakeholders but no strict decision-making process
existed to achieve full coordination. In Bangladesh, the consultation between headquarters and field
officers fell under the same semi-formal category. In Mali, in principle it was DFAIT that coordi-
nated Canadian activities, but in practice CIDA had more resources in the field and generally per-
formed this task. CIDA did not systematically inform DFAIT of all its activities in Mali because the
practice was for the embassy to report to the Department. The ambassador in principle produced
quarterly reports to DFAIT. In reality, however, they were often late due to lack of resources. In the
Mali case, some local bodies were specifically set up to ensure coordination: a Management
Committee (Comité de gestion); an Enlarged Cooperation Committee (Comité de coopération
élargi); and a Canadian Cooperation Coordination Committee (Comité de coordination de la
coopération canadienne).
As mentioned above, in all cases the embassy or High Commission played a central role in coordi-
nating actions in the field depending on Canada’s priorities in the country.
Concluding comments
To sum up, a number of key points emerged from the interviews as to where there were opportuni-
ties for improving coherence and how this might be achieved. It was clear that there were certain dif-
ferences in policies which needed to be resolved at a fairly high level. In some cases, greater
exchange of information about departmental mandates and operational plans (including projects)
could help to improve interdepartmental relations. Certainly it was considered important that CIDA
make greater efforts to raise consciousness about its mandate and operating environment, at the
same time as trying to understand the mandate and environment of OGDs. Informal channels
should be used more to promote coherence, while not neglecting formal structures. If departments
are provided with programming budgets to fulfil the international aspects of their policy mandate,
this may relieve tensions with CIDA.
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Policy coherence requires drivers of coherence. In both CIDA and DFAIT we were told that there
needed to be a focal point in each department to which other departments could turn to request or
transmit information. But “to coordinate is not a passive verb”, one person said, “no one likes to be
coordinated.”184 There needs to be a willingness in each department to coordinate with a view to
achieve coherence.
Current coherence initiatives
A number of initiatives have been underway in the Canadian government that are not directly related
to discussions of policy coherence in development assistance. However, the systematic examination
of the policy-making process and apparent constraints to coherent and effective policy-making offers
some avenues for discussing policy coherence in an ODA context. 
The Policy Research Initiative (PRI)
One process to address horizontal issues in policy-making is the Policy Research Initiative (PRI).
The PRI was launched in 1996 by the then Clerk of the Privy Council to identify policy challenges
for Canada. A series of reports were produced that identified new realities facing the Government of
Canada with a view to identifying future policy research capacity and needs. 
Initially there was a set of four interdepartmental networks (Growth, Human Development, Social
Cohesion, Global Challenges and Opportunities) linking departments’ and agencies’ research and
policy groups, with each network tasked with finding ways to address cross-cutting issues. Although
initially focused on interdepartmental relations in the federal government, the PRI’s longer-term
objective has begun to extend coordination to other orders of government and the policy research
community outside government to overcome the decline in public sector policy research capacity
that has occurred over the last two decades.185 Policy research, though the basis of policy-making,
had been seriously affected by government downsizing. There was also a realization that policy-mak-
ing had become reactive rather than proactive. 
For policy research to address horizontal issues effectively, an early PRI report emphasized demand
must originate from the political level (i.e., ministers) and the public service. In this sense it echoed
some of the results from our interviews. Coordination with a view to coherence must be a goal at all
levels and it must be carried out at all levels.
The 1997 report, Canada 2005: Global Challenges and Opportunities, placed considerable emphasis on
the way Canada was being affected by globalization and on the need to rethink the interdepartmental
relations and the linkages between domestic and international policies: 
“All federal government departments recognize the importance of adapting their policy ini-
tiatives in light of international developments, and using international mechanisms to pursue
domestic policy interests and objectives. Clearly, there are no longer “international” and
“domestic departments”; all are influenced by global economic, social and political develop-
ments.”186
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Reasserting Canada’s reliance on foreign markets for domestic growth and employment, the report
advocated Canadian leadership in rules-based international regimes. With respect to developing
countries, it suggested the government turn its attention to:
• The opportunities and threats to Canadian products and services in emerging markets, and
the development of micro-economic and social policy response;
• Strategies to address the growth of natural resource production in emerging economies with
lower labour costs;
• Facilitating the export of Canadian know-how, natural resources science, technologies, and
services to emerging competitors;
• Using Canadian development cooperation to ensure the IFIs’ investment in emerging
economies to social equity, gender equality, and sustainable development; and
• Addressing basic human needs and opening up developing economies that are at risk of fur-
ther marginalization.187
The Policy Research Initiative is interesting because it provides a model by which horizontal issues
can be addressed by a multiplicity of departments in the policy-making process. Similar research ini-
tiatives can be useful to identify mechanisms to ensure that poverty reduction is taken into consider-
ation when making policy that applies to developing countries. Policy research networks would pro-
vide a tool for the systematic consideration of the effects of various government departments’ poli-
cies on the poverty situation in developing countries.
We must nevertheless sound a note of caution. The reports published in the context of the PRI speak
of community outside government policy-making circles. There have been several initiatives by PRI
to broaden outreach (from the publication of a journal to regular conferences and research funding).
But it is the academic community, more than civil society, that has benefited by this outreach. The
balance sheet of the Government of Canada on collaboration and consultation with civil society in
the 1990s was not altogether positive.188 There have been cases of significant and genuine consulta-
tion but there have also been examples of reluctance to let the public participate. Consultations with
civil society take on a variety of forms, some of which have not allowed for meaningful participation.
Further efforts are being made in the context of the Voluntary Sector Initiative described below.
Poverty reduction efforts in developing countries and CIDA’s involvement, by contrast, require
meaningful consultations with recipient governments and civil society, both domestic and in the
developing countries. As a demand-driven agency committed to recipients’ ownership of projects,
CIDA requires a mechanism whereby the interests of recipients and development partners in Canada
as well as inputs of development analysts can be represented in the Canadian government and fac-
tored in all departments’ policy-making with respect to developing countries.
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The Voluntary Sector Initiative
In February 1999, the Voluntary Sector Roundtable, an unincorporated group of national organiza-
tions and coalitions created in 1995, published a report entitled Building on Strength: Improving
Governance and Accountability in Canada’s Voluntary Sector189 (also known as the Broadbent Report).
The Report made some 40 recommendations on governance and accountability in the voluntary sec-
tor and its relation to government and policy-making. 
The report noted the suspicion between government and the voluntary sector stemming from unilat-
eral government cuts to funding and downloading of services that impacted populations represented
by the voluntary sector.190 There were also several criticisms of the voluntary sector that caused civil
society organizations to mistrust the government:
“The capacity of the sector has also been hampered by the lack of understanding and knowl-
edge of some critics. Over the past decade, many voluntary organizations have had their
credibility challenged by being labelled with the derogatory term, “special interest groups”,
and their work belittled by the suggestion that they make no constructive contributions to
public policy, civil society or the economy.”191
More than a simple recognition of the existence of the voluntary sector, the report requested the vol-
untary sector be given “a voice at the Cabinet table”, so that civil society might have a say in policy
when it was being made. To ensure policy coherence in the face of the multiplicity of demands ema-
nating from the NGO community, it further suggested the appointment of a minister and an internal
policy coordinating unit to work horizontally within government.192
In June 2000, the Canadian government responded to the report with the publication by the Privy
Council Office of the document, Partnering for the Benefit of Canadians: Government of Canada-
Voluntary Sector Initiative.193 The Voluntary Sector Initiative stated two objectives: to increase the
capacity of the voluntary sector to meet the demands of Canadian society; and to improve govern-
ment policies, programs and services.
The government’s response restated throne speech initiatives and announced the development of an
accord that would recognize the relationship between the government and the voluntary sector and
articulate principles to guide the relationship. A joint tables process would be used to develop a con-
sultation document, a consultation strategy and an implementation plan. The purpose of the joint
tables was to provide a voluntary sector “lens” on policy and programs. In addition, it proposed a
National Volunteerism Initiative to “expand volunteer effort and promote volunteering.” Its purpose
would be to set criteria for program design, organizational eligibility, resource allocations, priority
setting, and scope and purpose of activities.
Relationship-building measures between government and the voluntary sector were also suggested to
reinforce cooperation between the two. In response to the recommendation of a minister in charge
of dealing with the voluntary sector, the government announced the creation of a Reference Group
of Ministers. The purpose of the group was to provide strategic policy direction and coordination for
government responses to voluntary sector requests. The operational leadership of the Initiative was
ensured by an ADM Steering Committee for the Voluntary Task Force created in PCO in 1998.194
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The Voluntary Sector Initiative offered an avenue for Canadian development advocates to raise the
profile of poverty reduction in government and to inform other parts of the voluntary sector of the
links between domestic policy-making and foreign policy-making, in particular as it regards poverty
in developing countries. Nevertheless, while it indicated an acknowledgement on the part of govern-
ment of the interest of civil society in policy, such a structure makes sense only if it can provide for
meaningful participation on the part of development advocates in development cooperation and for-
eign policy. 
Moreover, the various groups that comprise the voluntary sector must, like government departments
active in developing countries, learn to think horizontally and advocate policy that addresses poverty
reduction in developing countries. As noted previously, the traditional distinction between domestic
and foreign policy is no longer applicable. It is essential to recognize this reality if advocacy on the
part of the voluntary sector is to reach the goals of their members without undermining poverty
reduction objectives in developing countries.
The Partnership for International Cooperation
The Partnership for International Cooperation was launched in April 2000 by the Canadian Centre
for Management Development (CCMD) to ease foreign countries’ access to Canadian public sector
expertise. The Partnership forms part of CCMD’s mandate “to become a world-class centre of excel-
lence in public sector management and to share ideas with others in the world trying to build a
strong, competent public sector.” 
It seeks to coordinate and rationalize the international activities of various government
departments — as of 1998-99, federal public sector institutions were involved in some 300 interna-
tional cooperation projects and hosted more than 1,100 foreign delegations in Canada. The
Partnership is based on the recognition that in recent years many government institutions have
acquired an international dimension both by going abroad to provide [sell] services and by hosting
foreign representatives in Canada. As Annex Table 4.1 illustrates, many departments have included
international dimensions in their mandates and carry out a number of international activities to this
end. 
The Partnership has established two networks:
• Governance and Public Sector Management: This refers to the central institutions and agen-
cies (Parliament, courts, international affairs, public sector management). They are the insti-
tutions in charge of providing the overarching structure for the operations of sectoral
departments and agencies;
• Sectoral Departments and Agencies: They are the institutions directly involved in given sec-
tors. In their international activities, they carry out projects following requests by foreign
countries. They may be approached directly for their services or act as executing agencies for
CIDA when CIDA is solicited by developing countries.
Institutionally, the Partnership aims to set up a single window for access to federal government
resources for foreign countries and international organizations. Services offered touch on both pub-
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lic sector management — a core, initial, function of CCMD — and sector-specific expertise accumu-
lated in government departments and agencies. The main advantage of the single-window approach
is that it allows easy identification of “who does what” in the Canadian government. 
In its current form, however, the Partnership remains silent on a number of points. First, it has not
yet addressed the issue of how projects being undertaken in developing countries relate to CIDA’s
poverty reduction objective, let alone the broader issue of policy coherence. The focus has been on
coordination to increase the efficiency of project delivery, and thus to do more internationally with
less. There is no formal coordination mechanism to ensure that the services provided by departments
to developing countries will reinforce or at least not undermine the poverty reduction efforts CIDA
undertakes in the same countries. Would-be recipients or clients may be directed to the relevant
departments but this should not result in these departments acting independently from CIDA when
developing countries are concerned. 
At the very least, the department or agency implementing a project must also be aware of the impor-
tance of poverty reduction and plan accordingly. CIDA’s participation in the Partnership network, as
well as the fact that Partnership staff have had considerable experience in CIDA, may help to develop
this understanding of and coordination with CIDA’s work in developing countries. While there have
been no discussions yet about policy coherence, it seems that the collaborative efforts at the project
level and the development of a greater understanding of departmental objectives in international
work may provide a solid base for discussions about policy coherence in the future.
Second, the question of funding remains to be addressed. This is an important source of tension
between aid and non-aid policies with respect to developing countries. CCMD’s Partnership does
not indicate the means by which services provided by government departments and agencies would
be funded. In fact, it has recognized that the requests for services exceed the capacity of the govern-
ment to supply them. The Partnership presents itself as a demand-driven process to which requests
are made. In this way, it appears to resemble CIDA’s own demand-driven programming. However, it
is clear that CIDA’s responses to requests from developing countries are to be funded with CIDA’s
programming budget. Other departments, including DFAIT, possess no such budget. When they do,
it is already insufficient for some projects in which they are currently engaged.
One obvious solution to the lack of funding is cost recovery — a method already used in some
departments. Cost recovery would serve two purposes. First, it would allow government departments
to provide more services while remaining within their allotted budget. Second, it would ensure that
Canadian taxpayers would not foot the bill for benefits that accrue only to a foreign recipient, in this
case developing countries. However, it is doubtful that developing countries would possess the nec-
essary resources; so CIDA might be required to grant developing countries the money to pay for
OGDs’ services.
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Good practices and potential solutions
In the course of several interviews with government officials on their perception of policy coherence
in Canadian foreign policy, a number of examples of good coordination were given (climate change,
Haiti, East Asia). Interviewees were at times reluctant to argue that these good practices were replic-
able in other settings. There were also recurring references to personality as an important factor
behind cooperation or lack thereof. This had the effect of downplaying the institutional determi-
nants of coherence. We were also reminded that solutions to the problem of coherence ought to
consider the scarcity in personnel and financial resources, as formal structures require lengthy and
costly preparation. Others stressed the importance of informal contacts. 
A study of various donors’ institutional structures and ODA policy toward Africa confirmed the
somewhat contradictory findings of the interviews. It showed that different institutional arrange-
ments did not produce significantly different results in terms of development success.195 Structures
were nevertheless necessary to foster interaction between the persons, departments, and agencies
involved with developing countries and whose activities had an impact on poverty. 
Based on the different models identified in Section 3 of this report, “Current international applica-
tions”, three basic models that exist in other OECD countries could be envisaged to restructure
Canadian ODA policy-making and implementation. Two other solutions involve additions to the
current structure.
1. Integrated ministry of foreign affairs. This option would require a merger of the current
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade with the Canadian International
Development Agency.  In keeping with the idea of integration, CIDA would become a divi-
sion in its own right of DFAIT, keeping its minister and having a deputy minister, much like
the Foreign Affairs Division and the Trade Division. Policy would be developed jointly by all
three divisions where developing countries are concerned. The branches within each division
could be organized by issues or geographically.
2. Autonomous aid agency. This option would retain the formal distinction that currently exists
between CIDA and DFAIT. The autonomy of the aid agency would mean a complete
delinking of CIDA, DFAIT, and other departments. Each department/agency would develop
its own policy toward developing countries. As interviews have revealed, extensive contacts
exist between the two bodies although they may sometimes be conflictual. Currently, even
when policies are distinct, other departments turn to CIDA for funding for lack of resources
for development-related activities.
3. Development coherence board. This option would create a structure that would bring together
mainly CIDA, DFAIT, and the Department of Finance. All development-relevant activities
of the agency and departments would be subject to policy coherence criteria. Relations
between CIDA, DFAIT, and the Department of Finance would be institutionalized rather
than taking place at the informal level between officials or at the political level in regular
Cabinet meetings.
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4. Policy coherence secretariat. This option would create a body separate from departments and
agencies which would be responsible to the Prime Minister’s Office or the Privy Council
Office. The secretariat would be informed of all government department policies concerning
developing countries and would direct information to other departments and organize dia-
logue on an as-needed basis to address the sources of incoherence identified.
5. Policy coherence officer/branch. This option would create a position or a staffed branch within
each department. The officer or branch would scan the department’s or agency’s policies,
programs, and projects in light of the mandates of all departments involved with developing
countries. It would be responsible for informing other policy coherence officers or branches
of departmental policies toward developing countries and of establishing contacts on an as-
needed basis to resolve conflicts. The policy coherence officer or branch would be answer-
able directly to the minister or the minister’s office.
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Conclusions 
In this report, we have undertaken:
• A review of the burgeoning literature on policy coherence, particularly as it is applied to
poverty reduction efforts in developing countries;
• A review of the structures, policies, and procedures in place in many countries to promote
more effective policies toward developing countries; and 
• A review of the Canadian context based primarily on a series of interviews with officials in a
number of different departments and agencies with active interests in developing countries
and in collaboration with CIDA.
What emerged from the research are a number of points:
• There is growing interest in policy coherence across a broad range of issues, including
poverty reduction. The work of the DAC is probably furthest ahead, with a set of guidelines
and increasing scrutiny being given to donors’ policy coherence in the course of DAC aid
reviews. Here the focus is on coherence at three levels — coherence between a donor’s aid
policies and those of its partner countries (both recipients and other donors and multilateral
agencies), coherence within a donor’s own aid policies, and coherence between a donor’s aid
and other economic/political policies that may affect developing countries.
• The World Bank is also moving in this direction, with the PRSP emerging as the key instru-
ment within the overall CDF for a government to coordinate donor policies with its own.
Other multilateral efforts to promote coherence have involved the Bank, the IMF, the
WTO, and the UN. The integration of the UN into this dialogue — and the UNDP’s own
work on global public goods — may help to keep the coherence agenda focused on poverty
reduction. 
• Several donor countries have been concerned about how best to position their development
agencies within their overall government structures in order to achieve greater coherence.
While some countries have moved to increase the autonomy of their development agencies
from foreign affairs ministries, and to increase the influence of the agency within interde-
partmental dialogue and Cabinet decision-making, others have begun a process of consolida-
tion. More important than the institutional structure perhaps is a government’s overall com-
mitment to development cooperation and poverty reduction, and whether this is reflected at
the highest political level and/or in a legislated framework. 
• Donor governments need a clearly defined commitment to poverty reduction and a set of
policies to achieve that commitment. As the OECD-DAC has underlined, efforts are still
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required to ensure vertical coherence — that is, that donors follow their own policies in the
field. More recently DAC has focused on the issue of horizontal coherence — that is, estab-
lishing procedures and making resources available for reviewing how the policies and prac-
tices of other government departments and agencies relate to these development goals. 
• Monitoring the six areas identified by the OECD as key for policy coherence, namely for-
eign trade and investment, international finance, food and agriculture, natural resources and
sustainable development, social issues, and governance and conflict, could require significant
resources. Time and information are needed to monitor and evaluate the implications of
existing policies for poverty reduction efforts and to identify and negotiate alternatives that
are more coherent with development objectives.
• In Canada, it is clear that many departments are keen to work more closely with CIDA, as
their mandates are influenced by international developments and particularly by progress in
developing countries. Similarly, CIDA has an interest in helping to inform their policies and
activities which concern developing countries. Experience has shown, however, that tensions
may arise as priorities may differ — with some departments being particularly concerned to
promote the commercial interests of the sector they represent (e.g., agriculture, industry,
natural resources, environment, and health) although this is not their only, nor often their
primary, interest in developing countries.
• There have been a number of formal and informal initiatives to promote coherence in
Canadian policies toward developing countries. There were several earlier efforts on
finance/debt issues. More recent advances have been in the area of trade policy, with CIDA
increasing its capacities to influence policies through personnel dedicated to understanding
and promoting trade policies which support development through interdepartmental com-
mittees and staff within the mission in Geneva. Together with support from within DFAIT,
this contributed to the government decision in June 2002 to remove all tariffs and quotas on
imports from LDCs. Another success was the commitment to begin untying aid.
Considerably more action is needed to make Canadian trade policy coherent with its devel-
opment objectives — whether in the area of agriculture or intellectual property rights, to
name only two. Besides trade policy, greater coherence is needed in areas such as investment,
immigration, and defence.
• It is clear that CIDA cannot shoulder this responsibility on its own. OGDs should be
expected to play their part, at the very least by sharing information about their policies and
activities in developing countries, and at best by being open to discussion about alternatives.
The Partnership for International Cooperation has begun to build a sense of community
between the departments that are active internationally, and this could be used as the basis
for discussions about policy issues. It is possible that more tracking of OGDs’ activities in
developing countries may lead them to expect these to be covered out of ODA. 
• There are several institutional options for enhancing policy coherence. While these are
being debated, CIDA should consider establishing a policy coherence profile for the coun-
tries with which it is proposing enhanced partnerships. The policy coherence profile would
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include a database on the range of Canadian policies that affect each country as well as a list
of activities. The information would be used as a basis for discussion with OGDs about how
to promote more coherent policies toward that country.
• Outside government there is an important role to be played by civil society organizations
and policy analysts in Canada and in partner countries monitoring the range of Canadian
policies and activities that affect developing countries and considering alternatives that might
have a greater impact on poverty reduction.
References
APEC Economic Committee. “The Impact of Liberalisation: Communicating with APEC Communities. Studies in APEC
Liberalisation,” November 1998.
APEC. Joint Ministerial Statement. Sixth APEC Finance Ministers Meeting. Langkawi, Malaysia, May 15-16, 1999.
Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. “Is Aid Out of Date?” Canada Asia, no. 7, July 1999.
Bergbusch, Eric. “Development Odyssey Re-visited.” Behind the Headlines, vol. 56, no. 2 (Winter 1999).
Bergbusch, Eric. “Letter to the Editor.” Behind the Headlines, vol. 56, no. 3 (Spring 1999).
Bertrand, Jacques. “Civil Society and Conflict Prevention,” in Alison Van Rooy, ed., Canadian Development Report 1999: Civil
Society and Global Change. Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1999.
Blouin, Chantal, John Foster, and Ron Labonte. Canada’s Foreign Policy and Health: Toward Policy Coherence. Prepared for the
Commission of the Future of Health Care in Canada, June 2002. 
Brecher, Irving. “Canadian Foreign Policy: ‘Show me the Money’.” Behind the Headlines, vol. 55, no. 1 (Spring 1997). 
Canada. House of Commons. Canada and the Future of the World Trade Organization: Advancing a Millennium Agenda in the
Public Interest. Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services, June 1999.
Canadian International Development Agency. Canada Making a Difference in the World: A policy statement on strengthen-
ing aid effectiveness. Hull: September 2002.  
CCIC and NSI. “Policy Coherence, ODA, and International Policy.” A Report on a Seminar Co-sponsored by the CCIC
and The North-South Institute. Mimeo, April 10, 1997.
Cooper, Andrew F. Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1997.
Copeland, Daryl. “Hard Reality, Soft Power: Canadian Foreign Policy in the Era of Globalization.” Behind the Headlines,
vol. 55, no. 4 (Summer 1998).
Daudelin, Jean and Fred Osler Hampson. “Human Security and Development Policy.” Mimeo, The North-South Institute,
March 1999.
Eurostep. “Restructuring of the European Commission: Implications for International Development.” Maastricht: European
Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of Peoples, 1999. http://www.oneworld.org/eurostep/rescom.htm. Accessed August
8, 1999.
Eurostep. “Development Co-operation in the EU after the reform of the Council.” Brussels: July 8, 2002.
http:/www.eurostep.org/press/comment/c020708.htm. Accessed November 8, 2002.
Forster, Jacques  and Olav Stokke, eds. Policy Coherence in Development Cooperation. London: Frank Cass, 1999.
Fukasaku, Kiichiro and Denizhan Erocal. “The Challenge of Policy Coherence in Development Cooperation: An Issues
Paper.” Paper delivered at the “Technical Workshop on Enhancing Coherence in OECD Policies Towards Developing
Countries: The Case of ASEAN.” Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, July 1-2, 1993.
67
Hoebink, Paul. “Coherence and Development Policy: The Case of the European Union.” Paper delivered at the EADI con-
ference “Globalisation, Competitiveness and Human Security: Challenges for Development Policy and Institutional
Change.” Vienna,  September 11-14,  1996.
Huff and Associates. “Global Food Security: A Project to Improve Communication and Coordination Among Federal
Government Agencies, Phase I.” Report prepared for Policy Branch, CIDA, June 15, 1999.
Hyun-sik Chang et al., “A Comparison of Management Systems for Development Co-operation in OECD/DAC
Members.” Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, July 5, 1999.
Inter Pares. “An Honourable Commitment. Policy Coherence in Canada’s Relations with the Global South.” Ottawa,
February 2001.
Koulaïmah-Gabriel, Andrea and Lou Box, “Toward Coherence? Development Cooperation Policy and the Development of
Policy Cooperation.” ECDPM Working Paper No. 21. Maastricht, May 1997.
Koulaïmah-Gabriel, Andrea and Ad Oomen. “Improving Coherence: Challenges for European Development Cooperation.”
Policy Management Brief No. 9. Maastricht: ECDPM. http://www. Oneworld.org/ecdpm/pmb/b9f_gb.htm. Accessed May
10, 1998.
Koulaïmah-Gabriel, Andrea and Lou Box. “The EU and the Developing World: The Issue of Coherence Between the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Development Cooperation.” ECDPM Working Paper No. 12. Maastricht:
European Centre for Development Policy Management, 1997. http://www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/pubs/wp21_gb.htm.
Accessed May 10, 1998.
Lancaster, Carol. Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
Liaison Committee of Development NGOs to the European Union. “Implementing Horizon 2000: Poverty Eradication
and Coherence of European Politics.” Brussels: Eurostep, February 1996. http://www.ecdpm.org/liaison/horiz_gb.htm.
Accessed May 11, 1998.
Loquai, Christiane. “The Europeanisation of Development Cooperation: Coordination, Complementarity, Coherence.”
ECDPM Working Paper No. 13. Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 1996.
http://www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/pubs/ wp13_gb.htm. Accessed May 10, 1998.
Mitchell, Robert E. “How to Link Democratic Governance with Economic Growth.” American Diplomacy, vol. III, no. 4.
(Autumn 1998).
Mkandawire, Thandika. “Policy Coherence: Trends and Policy Implications for International Development Co-operation.”
Prepared for the Parliamentary Commission on Swedish Policy for Global Development, April 2001. 
Morrison, David R. Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 1999.
OECD. “Building Policy Coherence.” Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1997,
http://www.oecd.org/puma/gvrnance/strat/coherenc.htm. Accessed May 10, 1998.
OECD. The DAC Guidelines. Poverty Reduction, Paris, 2001. 
OEDC/DAC. Development Co-operation Review Series: Norway. No 24. Paris, 1996.
OECD/DAC. Development Co-operation Review Series: United Kingdom. No. 25. Paris, 1997.
OEDC/DAC. Development Co-operation Review Series: The Netherlands. No. 24. Paris, 1997.
OECD/DAC. DAC Scoping Study of Donor Poverty Reduction Policies and Practices. Paris, 1999. Accessed at
http://www.oecd.org/dac/htm/pubs/pov_scop.htm 
OECD/DAC. Development Co-operation. Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. 1997
Report. Paris, 1998.
Pratt, Cranford. “DFAIT’s Takeover Bid of CIDA: The Institutional Future of the Canadian International Development
Agency.” Canadian Foreign Policy, vol. 5, no. 2 (Winter 1998).
Pratt, Cranford. “Greater Policy Coherence, a Mixed Blessing: The Case of Canada,” in  Forster and Stokke, eds, Policy
Coherence in Development Cooperation. 1999.
Pratt, Cranford. “Competing Rationales for Canadian Development Assistance: Reducing Global Poverty; Enhancing
68
69
Canadian Prosperity and Security; or Advancing Human Rights.” International Journal, vol. 55, no. 2 (Spring 1999).
Robins, Nick. “Making Soft Policies Bite: Lessons from EC Efforts at Environmental Integration for Achieving
Development Coherence.” Paper delivered at the conference “Coherence and Cooperation: How to Improve the Coherence
of EU Development Policy.” Maastricht, February 20-21, 1997. http://www.ecdpm.org/euforic/eurodc/rob_env.htm.
Accessed May 10, 1998.
Robinson, Mark, “Donor Policies on Participatory Development and Good Governance.” Paper delivered at the
“International Workshop on Policy Coherence in Development Cooperation.” Geneva, April 24-26, 1997.
Schmitz, Gerald J. “The Verdict on Aid Effectiveness: Why the Jury Stays Out.” International Journal, vol. LI, no. 2 (Spring
1996).
Smillie, Ian. “Notes on the Structure and Restructuring of Official Development Assistance in Europe and Elsewhere.”
Mimeo. March 1997.
Stryker, J. Dirck and Daniel Plunkett. Policy Coherence & Poverty Reduction, Associates for International Resources and
Development for the OECD/DAC/Informal Network on Poverty Reduction, August 2000.
Taylor, James H. “Canadian Foreign Policy and National Interests.” Behind the Headlines, vol. 56, no. 3 (Spring 1999).
The Economist, January 9, 1999. “Canada. Not so caring.” p. 34.
Thérien, Jean-Philippe and Carolyn Lloyd. “Development Assistance on the Brink.” Mimeo. January 1999.
Voipio, Timo. “Coherence of Policies Towards Developing Countries: The Case of Finland.” Paper delivered at the
“International Workshop on Policy Coherence in Development Cooperation.” Geneva, April 24-26, 1997.
Wright, Art. “Human Security in Canadian Foreign Policy.” Behind the Headlines, vol. 56, no. 3 (Spring 1999).
US, Canada, Germany, Italy, France, UK, Japan. Communiqué to the Managing Director and the Members of the





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 See Chantal Blouin, John Foster, and Labonte, Ron, Canada’s Foreign Policy and Health: Toward Policy Coherence.
Report prepared for the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada (Ottawa: NSI, 2002).
2 Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc Stern, eds, Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press for UNDP, 1999).
3 Ibid., “Executive Summary.”
4 One of the consequences of other government departments beginning to track their financial contribution to global
public goods may be a reduction in funds available for more traditional aid activities.
5 Marrakesh Agreement, Article III.5, April 1994.
6 Article 36. Also, “We are aware that the challenges Members face in a rapidly changing international environment cannot
be addressed through measures taken in the trade field alone.” Article 5, Ministerial Declaration, November 14, 2001.
With respect to technical cooperation and capacity building, it is noted that “a coherence policy framework and
timetable” are needed (Article 39).
7 Paras 52, 69, and 71. “52. In order to complement national development efforts, we recognize the urgent need to enhance
coherence, governance, and consistency of the international monetary, financial and trading systems. To contribute to
that end, we underline the importance of continuing to improve global economic governance and to strengthen the
United Nations leadership role in promoting development. With the same purpose, efforts should be strengthened at the
national level to enhance coordination among all relevant ministries and institutions. Similarly, we should encourage pol-
icy and programme coordination of international institutions and coherence at the operational and international levels to
meet the Millennium Declaration development goals of sustained economic growth, poverty eradication and sustainable
development.” Monterrey Consensus, March 1, 2002. 
8 OECD,  The DAC Guidelines. Poverty Reduction, Paris, 2001, p. 91.
9 OECD/DAC, DAC Scoping Study of Donor Poverty Reduction Policies and Practices, Paris,  1999. Accessed at
http://www.oecd.org/dac/htm/pubs/pov_scop.htm.
10 OECD, DAC Guidelines, 2001, para. 44 and p. 107.
11 Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century (1997) and Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalization
Work for the Poor (2000).
12 Globkom (Kommittén om Sveriges politik för global utveckling) presented its final report in March 2002. An English
summary “Executive summary: A new Swedish policy for global development,” is available at
http://www.globkom.net/english.phtml. Inter alia, it suggests creating a citizens’ forum to help bring about greater policy
coherence (p. 10).
13 See various reports by the ECDPM.
14 OECD. “Towards Policy Coherence for Poverty Reduction,” in The DAC Guidelines. Poverty Reduction. Paris:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001. pp. 93-94.
15 CIDA, Canada making a difference in the world. A policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness, September 2002, p. 17. 
16 Inter Pares, An Honourable Commitment. Policy Coherence in Canada’s Relations with the Global South.” Ottawa,
2001, p. 16.
17 In the case of CIDA, as Inter Pares notes (p. 37), there is a role to be played by Partnership Branch, bringing its partners’
experiences to bear, and thus complementing Policy Branch, in the wider foreign policy debates within government.
18 OECD, Towards Policy Coherence…, p. 89.
19 “Financing for Development. Implementing the Monterrey Consensus.” Prepared by the Bank for the Spring 2002
Development Committee Meeting, April 11, 2002 at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/FfD/2002/imp.htm).  
20 In the case of CIDA, as Inter Pares notes (p. 37), there is a role to be played by Partnership Branch, bringing its partners’
experiences to bear, and thus complementing Policy Branch, in the wider foreign policy debates within government. Inter
Pares. “An Honourable Commitment. Policy Coherence in Canada’s Relations with the Global South.” Ottawa,
February 2001.
21 Paul Nelson. ‘Access and Influence: tensions and ambiguities in the World Bank’s expanding relationship with civil soci-
ety organizations.’ Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 2002. p. 21.
73
22 CIDA, Jamaica Country Development Program Plan 2002-2007, at http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca, p.40.
23 Thanks to Dal Brodhead, who reviewed the Bangladesh paper, for this suggestion. 
24 See for example, CIDA, Jamaica Country Development Program Plan 2002-2007 which specifically mentions the areas of
security, trade, investment, and technology transfer (p. 28).
25 Jacques Forster and Olav Stokke, eds, Policy Coherence in Development Cooperation (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp.23-24.
26 See for instance the series of NSI studies on the implications of structural adjustment policies in Africa published in the
late 1980s-early 1990s, and Lynn R. Brown and Joanna Kerr, eds,  The Gender Dimensions of Economic Reforms in Ghana,
Mali and Zambia (Ottawa: NSI, 1997).  
27 The North-South Institute, Canada and the Developing World.  Key Issues for Canada’s Foreign Policy (Ottawa: The North-
South Institute, 1994) p. 41.
28 OECD/DAC, Development Cooperation. Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. 1997
Report (Paris: OECD, 1998), p. 14. 
29 Kiichiro Fukasaku and Denizhan Erocal, “The Challenge of Policy Coherence in Development Cooperation: An Issues
Paper.”Paper delivered at the Technical Workshop on Enhancing Coherence of OECD Policies towards Developing
Countries: The Case of ASEAN (Paris: OECD, July 1-2, 1993).
30 Fukasaku and Erocal, “The Challenge of Policy Coherence”, p. 4.
31 Ibid., , p. 11.
32 Ibid., p. 4. 
33 Forster and  Stokke, Policy Coherence in Development Cooperation, pp. 4-5.
34 Paul Hoebink, “Coherence and Development Policy: The Case of the European Union.” Paper delivered at the EADI
conference on Globalisation, Competitiveness and Human Security: Challenges for Development Policy and Institutional
Change, Vienna, September 11-14, 1996: Timo Voipio, “Coherence of Policies towards Developing Countries the Case
of Finland,” and Mark Robinson, “Donor Policies on Participatory Development and Good Governance.” Both papers
delivered at the International Workshop on Policy Coherence in Development Cooperation, Geneva, April 24-26, 1997.
35 Robinson, “Donor Policies on Participatory Development and Good Governance”,  p. 4.
36 Ibid.,  p. 12.
37 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
38 OECD/DAC, Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation (Paris: OECD, 1996), p. 18.
39 OECD/DAC, Development Cooperation. Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee
(Paris: OECD, 1997), p. 14.
40 Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc Stern, eds, Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press for UNDP, 1999).
41 Ibid,, “We have entered a new era of public policy, defined by a growing number of concerns that straddle national bor-
ders. That is the overarching policy message emanating from this work, and it poses a dual challenge. One is the need to
transform international cooperation from its traditional place as “external affairs” into policy-making applicable to most,
if not all, domestic issue areas. The second challenge is to develop the concepts and instruments needed to overcome
problems of collective action. In particular this will require actions to “internalize the externalities” — to deal with poten-
tially contagious phenomena at the source, before they spill across the borders”, p. xxv.
42 The report suggests the creation of “national externality profiles”, p. xxvii and pp. 470-71.
43 Kaul et al., p. xxviii. The report calls for “re-engineering of national approaches to international issues … to ensure that
thematic and sectoral government entities have the capability to address and manage global interdependence in their
respective areas of work.  This can be achieved by introducing foreign affairs responsibilities into relevant ministries or by
incorporating domestic concerns more systematically into foreign affairs”, p. 473. Also, “domestic affairs and external
affairs have to blend so that international cooperation becomes an integral part of national public policy-making”, p. 478. 
44 Ibid., p. 497.
45 Andrea Koulaïmah-Gabriel and Lou Box, “The EU and the Developing World: The Issue of Coherence Between the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Development Cooperation” (Maastricht: European Centre for Development
Policy Management, 1997).
74
46 Liaison Committee of Development NGOs to the European Union, “Implementing Horizon 2000: Poverty Eradication
and Coherence of European Politics”, Brussels, 1996, p. 28.
47 Eurostep, “Restructuring of the European Commission: Implications for International Development” (Brussels:
Eurostep, 1999). 
48 Eurostep, “Restructuring of the European Commission”, p. 5.
49 Eurostep, “Development Co-operation in the EU after the reform of the Council,” July 8, 2002.
50 Ibid.
51 Bernard Wood, “Development Cooperation in the 21st Century.” Presentation at The North-South Institute,  January
13, 2000, p. 13.
52 See, for instance, a recent paper by G. K. Helleiner, “Changing Aid Relationships in Tanzania” (mimeo, March 1999).
Helleiner distinguishes between government leadership in the macroeconomic sphere (e.g., on public expenditure reviews
and the design of the Policy Framework Paper), at the sectoral level, and at the local government/district level. Some
progress has been achieved at the first level. But the number of coordination meetings has not declined, and may have
increased with the new sector-wide approach to aid management (p. 18). The shift to government-led sector-wide poli-
cies from donor-controlled projects could be quite significant (p. 8). Donors are likely to find it more difficult, however,
to integrate their activities with those of an increasingly decentralized government (p. 10).  
53 OECD, DAC Scoping Study of Donor Poverty Reduction Policies and Practices (Paris: OECD, 1999), p. xi.
54 Ibid., p. xvi.
55 OECD, The DAC Guidelines. Poverty Reduction, Paris, 2001.
56 Ibid., p. 105.
57 Ibid., Summary  Para 46.
58 Ibid., Para 47.
59 DAC, “Peer Review of Canada. Questionnaire for the Mission to Ottawa”, July 2002, mimeo.
60 Hyun-sik Chang et al., “A Comparison of Management Systems for Development Co-operation in OECD/DAC
Members” (Paris: OECD, July 5,  1999), p. 29.
61 We use the typology of Chang et al., “A Comparison of Management Systems”, p. 32 ff.
62 From Chang et al., “A Comparison of Management Systems”, p. 38 and USAID website.
63 Information collected during interview.
64 OECD/DAC, Development Co-operation Review Series: United Kingdom, No. 25. Paris, 1997, p. 31.
65 From Chang et al., “A Comparison of Management Systems”, p. 38.
66 OECD/DAC, The DAC Journal. International Development, 2001, vol. 2, no. 4, p. I-45.
67 OECD/DAC, Development Co-operation Review Series: United Kingdom, p. 8.
68Patrick Wintour and Charlotte Denny, “Overruled: Short loses in aid row,” The Guardian
December 20, 2001, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ethical/article/0,2763,622042,00.html This would lead to export
licenses being rejected if sustainable development criteria were not met.
69 http://ww.cabinet-office.gov.uk/innovation/1999/purpose.htm Consulted March 9, 2000.
70 UK Cabinet Office, Rights of exchange: social, health, environmental and trade objectives on the global stage, Performance and
Innovation Unit Report, September 2000. This project was commissioned in December 1999 to provide the UK govern-
ment with a policy framework for balancing social, health, and environmental objectives with that of increasing trade lib-
eralization.
71 OEDC/DAC, Development Co-operation Review Series: The Netherlands, No. 24, Paris, 1997, p. 14.
72 OEDC/DAC, Development Co-operation Review Series: The Netherlands, No. 24, Paris, 1997, p. 13.
73 OECD/DAC, Development Co-operation Review Series: Norway, No.36, Paris, 1999.
74 Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada and the Future of the World Trade
Organization: Advancing a Millennium Agenda in the Public Interest, June 1999, p. 11. 
75
75 UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, New York, p. 112.
76 op. cit., p. 15-10. 
77 WT/GC/W/260, pp. 3 and 5. WTO, “Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference,” 21 July 1999.
78 WTO, “WTO holds high level trade symposia on environment and development,” Newsletter, No. 38, March 1999, p. 7. 
79 Ibid., p. 9.
80 Sylvia Ostry, “Future of the WTO”. Paper prepared for the Brookings Institution Trade Policy Forum conference on
Governing in a Global Economy,  April 15-16, 1999, p. 22.
81 Article 36. Also, “We are aware that the challenges Members face in a rapidly changing international environment cannot
be addressed through measures taken in the trade field alone.” Article 5, Ministerial Declaration, November 14, 2001.
With respect to technical cooperation and capacity building, it is noted that “a coherence policy framework and
timetable” are needed (Article 39).
82 Paras 52, 69, and 71. Para52: “In order to complement national development efforts, we recognize the urgent need to
enhance coherence, governance, and consistency of the international monetary, financial and trading systems. To con-
tribute to that end, we underline the importance of continuing to improve global economic governance and to strengthen
the United Nations leadership role in promoting development. With the same purpose, efforts should be strengthened at
the national level to enhance coordination among all relevant ministries and institutions. Similarly, we should encourage
policy and programme coordination of international institutions and coherence at the operational and international levels
to meet the Millennium Declaration development goals of sustained economic growth, poverty eradication and sustain-
able development.” Monterrey Consensus, March 1, 2002. 
83 James D. Wolfensohn, “A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework.” Discussion draft (Washington:
World Bank, January 21, 1999), p. 7.
84 Ibid., p. 9.
85 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
86 CDF Secretariat, “Comprehensive Development Framework. Meeting the Promise? Early Experience and Emerging
Issues”  (Washington, DC: World Bank, September 17, 2001),  pp. 2-3
87 According to Akio Takanayagi, in “Japan” in The Reality of Aid 2000, Earthscan Publications 2000, London, Japan was to
merge the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, the agency in charge of ODA loans, with the Japan Export Import
Bank in late 1999, to form the Japan International Cooperation Bank. There was concern that this merger would increase
the commercialization of Japanese aid. Instead, Takanayagi recommended “the establishment of a single governmental
agency that deals with all types of ODA — grants, technical aid and loans, as well as multilateral aid, and whose major
mission is poverty elimination”. More specifically he noted in a personal interview that the scope for the implementing
agencies to have much influence on ministry policies — whether finance, trade or other — might be limited by the fact
that employees did not have the same civil service standing as ministry officials.  
88 Andrew F. Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1997), p. 231.
89 Donald J. Savoie, Governing From the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 98-104.
90 Ibid., pp. 134-35.
91 Ibid., pp. 109-11.
92 Cranford Pratt, “DFAIT’s Takeover Bid of CIDA: The Institutional Future of the Canadian International Development
Agency.” Canadian Foreign Policy, vol. 5, no. 2 (Winter 1998), p. 1.
93 This is according to the former director of DEA’s Aid and Development Division. Eric Bergbusch, “Development
Odyssey Re-visited.” Behind the Headlines, vol. 56, no. 2 (Winter 1999),  p. 26.
94 Margaret Catley-Carson cited in Pratt, “DFAIT’s Takeover Bid of CIDA”, p. 2.
95 Cran Pratt, “Greater Policy Coherence: A Mixed Blessing”, in Forster and Stokke, editors, 1997, p. 86.
96 David R. Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 1998), p. 313.
97 Ibid., pp. 316-18.
98 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, p. 398.
76
99 Jean Daudelin and Fen Ole Hampson, “Human Security and Development Policy.” Concept paper prepared for the
Canadian International Development Agency, mimeo, March 1999, p. 6.
100 Lloyd Axworthy, “The New Diplomacy: The UN, the International Criminal Court and the Human Security Agenda.”
Notes for an address to a Conference on UN Reform and the Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.,
April 1998.
101 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, p. 415.  
102 Interview, Hull, June 18, 1999.
103 Interview, Ottawa, July 7, 1999. 
104 Interview, Hull, July 6, 1999.
105 Interview, Ottawa, July 6, 1999.
106 Interview, Hull, July 6, 1999.
107 Interview, Hull, June 17, 1999.
108 Interview, Hull, June 23, 1999. For reasons of confidentiality, company names are omitted. 
109 See CIDA, CIDA’s Policy for Private Sector Development in Developing Countries (Hull: CIDA, March 29, 1999).
110 Interview, Hull, July 8, 1999.
111 Interview, Hull, July 22, 1999.
112 Interview, Hull, June 18, 1999.
113 Interview, Hull, June 23, 1999.
114 Interview, Hull, June 23, 1999.
115 Interview, Hull, July 5, 1999. Also interview, Hull, July 8,1999.
116 See for instance Natural Resources Canada, Sustainable Development Strategy, Now and for the Future, 2002.
117 Interview, Ottawa, July 22, 1999.
118 Interview, Ottawa, July 15, 1999.
119 Interview, Ottawa, July 6, 1999.
120 Interview, Ottawa, July 6, 1999.
121 Interview, Ottawa, July 1999.
122 Interview, Ottawa, July 21, 1999.
123 Interview, Ottawa, July 15, 1999.
124 Pratt, in“Greater Policy Coherence,” notes the critical response to the International Assistance Policy Update developed
in 1993 under the leadership of Barbara McDougall in which External Affairs set out options for aid allocation, with a
view to establishing the overall orientation of the aid program (pp. 16-17). The initiative was dropped following oppo-
sition from CCIC and others.
125 Interview, Ottawa, July 6, 1999.
126 Interview, Ottawa, June 30, 1999.
127 Interview, Ottawa, July 6, 1999.
128 Interview, Ottawa, July 7, 1999.
129 Interview, Ottawa, July 6, 1999.
130 Interview, Ottawa, July 6, 1999.
131 Interview, Hull, July 23, 1999. 
132 Interview, Hull, June 29, 1999.
77
133 Interview, Hull, June 17, 1999.
134 Interview, Hull, June 18, 1999. 
135 Interview, Hull, June 29, 1999.
136 Interview, Hull, July 6, 1999.
137 Interview, Hull, June 17, 1999.
138 Interview, Hull, July 8, 1999.
139 Interview, Hull, July 22, 1999.
140 Interview, Hull, July 22, 1999.
141 Interview, Hull, July 6, 1999.
142 Interview, Hull, June 14, 1999.
143 Interview, Hull, June 23, 1999.
144 Interview, Hull, July 23, 1999.
145 Interview, Hull, July 21, 1999.
146 Interview, Ottawa, July 7, 1999.
147 Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, Estimates 2000-2001.Part II – Main Estimates (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 2000),
pp. 9-2
148 Interview, Ottawa, July 6, 1999.
149 Notes for an address by the Hon. Diane Marleau at the Canadian Centre for Management Development, January 29,
1999.
150 Interview, Hull, July 23, 1999.
151 Interview, Hull, June 23, 1999. 
152 Interview, Hull, July 23, 1999.
153 Interview, Hull, July 22, 1999.
154 Interview, Hull, July 27, 1999.
155 Interview, Hull, July 22, 1999.
156 Interview, Ottawa, July 21, 1999.
157 Interview, Ottawa, July 6, 1999. The Government of Canada’s Estimates for fiscal year 2000/01 for CIDA’s envelope are
C$1,875,664,000. See Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat 2000-2001 Estimates, pp. 9-12.
158 Interview, Ottawa, July 21, 1999.
159 Interview, Ottawa, June 30, 1999.
160 Interview, Hull, July 9, 1999.
161 It is interesting to note that the interviewee did not ask for CIDA guidelines but rather for instructions coming from the
OECD.
162 Interview, Ottawa, July 6, 1999.
163 Interview, Hull, July 22, 1999.
164 Interview, Hull, July 6, 1999
165 Interview, Hull, July 23, 1999.
166 Interview, Hull, July 22, 1999.
167 Interview, Hull, July 6, 1999.
168 Interview, Hull, June 29, 1999.
78
169 Interview, Hull June 30, 1999.
170 Interview, Hull, July 6, 1999.
171 Interview, Hull, July 22, 1999.
172 Interview, Hull, June 23, 1999.
173 Interview, Hull, July 8, 1999.
174 Interview, Ottawa, July 22, 1999.
175 Interview, Hull, June 18, 1999.
176 Interview, Hull, July 6, 1999.
177 Interview, Hull, June 23, 1999.
178 Interview, Hull, July 23, 1999.
179 Interview, Hull, June 14, 1999.
180 Interview, Hull, July 23, 1999.
181 Interview, Hull, June 17, 1999.
182 Faihmul Quadir with M. Mahbubur Rahman Morshed, Poverty and Policy Coherence: Canada’s Development Cooperation in
Bangladesh (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 2001).
183 The incoherence between Canada’s foreign policies which affect health in developing countries — and how this might
be resolved through the adoption of an overarching human rights framework — are examined in Chantal Blouin, John
Foster, and Ron Labonte, Canada’s Foreign Policy and Health: Toward Policy Coherence, prepared for the Commission on
the Future of Health Care in Canada, June 2002.
184 Interview, Hull, June 23, 1999.
185 PRI, “Policy Research in Canada: A Capacity for the Future”, discussion document, mimeo.
186 PRI, Canada 2005: Global Challenges and Opportunities. Report of the ADM Sub-Committee, vols. I and II, draft interim
report, February 1997. Available online at http://policyresearch.schoolnet.ca/keydocs/global/index-e.htm, accessed on
May 31, 1999. 
187 PRI, Canada 2005, vol. I, ch. V.
188 Alison van Rooy, “Fame and Flames: Reflections on Government Engagement with Civil Society.” Paper delivered at
the PRI National Policy Research Conference: Analysing the Trends, mimeo, Ottawa, November 25-26, 1999.
189 Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector, Building on Strength: Improving Governance and
Accountability in Canada’s Voluntary Sector, Final Report, February 1999.
190 Ibid., p. 16.
191 Ibid., p. 14.
192 Ibid., p. 17.
193 Privy Council Office, Partnering for the Benefit of Canadians: Government of Canada-Voluntary Sector Initiative (Ottawa:
Supply and Services, 1999).
194 In 2002,  Prime Minister Chrétien made the Minister for Canadian Heritage responsible for leading the government’s
efforts to strengthen its relationship with the voluntary sector.
195 Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done (Chicago and London:  University of Chicago Press, 1999),
pp. 222-25.
196 Departmental mandates in this table are taken from relevant departments’ websites. 
79
80
